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“PENNIES ON THE DOLLAR”: 
REALLOCATING RISK AND DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT LIABILITY 
Kristen Barnes* 
Many homeowners are unaware that they face the prospect of crushing 
personal financial liability if they default on their mortgage loans. While owners 
may appreciate that they can lose their homes to the lender if they fail to make 
payments in accordance with their loan terms, many do not fully comprehend 
that the exposure they have under such circumstances does not end with 
relinquishing the financed property. In what are known as recourse states, if the 
lender forecloses and the foreclosure sale does not yield an amount sufficient to 
cover the borrower’s outstanding debt balance, the lender may file for a 
deficiency judgment against the borrower to make-up the difference. Whereas in 
the past, in many jurisdictions, lenders have resorted to this remedy sparingly, 
there are signs that this lax approach is being abandoned. First and second 
mortgagees and private insurance companies are increasingly opting to 
aggressively pursue foreclosed homeowners for fear of leaving money on the 
table. To make matters worse, even in those situations where lenders determine 
that it is not economical for them to follow-up on collecting the debt from 
mortgagors where a deficiency exists, they are selling the deficiency judgment or 
the claim to debt collectors for pennies on the dollar.  Looking at a 
representative sample of mortgage laws and practices in California, Illinois, and 
Florida, this paper argues for the prohibition of deficiency judgments in the 
residential mortgage loan context. The Article also offers a proposal for anti-
deficiency legislation. Homebuyers and lenders are not equal players in the 
mortgage loan transaction. The disadvantages of homeowners are particularly 
apparent in times of severe economic crisis, like the current Great Recession. 
Excising the option of deficiency judgments from the loan negotiation will help 
to address the glaring inequities between parties.  
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“The economic interests of the state may justify the exercise of its 
continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with 
contracts.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Purchasing a home is risky business.  One major risk is that the lender will 
foreclose on a homeowner’s property if the homeowner defaults on his mortgage 
payments.2  How the risks should be allocated is a matter of great contention.3  
Should mortgage loan borrowers4 exclusively bear the risk for housing market 
fluctuations?  Is it appropriate to place a disproportionate share of the risk on 
borrowers?  This paper responds to the questions posed by arguing that the risks 
are misallocated in states that permit lenders to obtain personal liability 
judgments against borrowers if they default on their mortgage loans—namely, 
recourse states5—and in certain non-recourse states where the protections are too 
                                                                                                                                   
1. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 437 (1934). 
2. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.2 (1997). 
3. Compare Joseph W. Singer, Foreclosure and the Failure of Formality, or Subprime 
Conundrums and How to Fix Them, 46 CONN. L. REV. 497, 506 (2013) (arguing for the relaxation 
of rigid mortgage law requirements to protect vulnerable borrowers), with James B. Hughes, Jr., 
Taking Responsibility: A Different View of Mortgage Antideficiency and Redemption Statutes, 39 
ARIZ. L. REV. 117, 120 (1997) (arguing that borrowers should bear risk in proportion to the benefits 
received through lenders’ financing). 
4. The terms “borrower,” “mortgagor,” “buyer,” and “homeowner” are used 
interchangeably in this Article. The terms “mortgagee” and “lender” are also used interchangeably. 
5. See Mark Cappel, State Anti-Deficiency Laws & Non-Recourse Laws, BILLS.COM (July 
16, 2014), http://www.bills.com/anti-deficiency/ (listing and categorizing states by whether they 
allow lenders to pursue deficiency judgments); see also Debra Cassens Weiss, Ex-Homeowners 
Face “Foreclosure Hangover” as Banks Pursue Deficiency Judgments, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 3, 2011), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ex-homeowners_face_foreclosure_hangover_as_banks_ 
pursue_deficiency_judgment/ (stating that banks are escalating their pursuit of deficiency 
judgments).  
246 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 66: 243 
 
circumscribed.6  The risks should be redistributed to fall more heavily on lenders 
for several reasons.  Lenders can better evaluate the risks of the market than 
borrowers.  Lenders are an integral part of the industry that produces 
deficiencies.7  Lenders are more easily able to absorb the losses of loan defaults 
and foreclosure than individual borrowers.8  This paper takes a position at odds 
with the conventional freedom to contract principle in asserting that 
governmental intervention in residential mortgage loan contracts is warranted 
where there is an industry whose members function as dominant parties and who 
(1) are in a superior position with respect to having pertinent knowledge relative 
to the contemplated transaction, (2) have the exclusive power to structure the 
transaction by setting the terms and deciding who is an acceptable counterparty, 
(3) are incentivized by the prevailing legal and economic regime to maximize the 
gains of the members to the substantial detriment of the other party even when 
the overall effect on the industry or the economy is negative, and (4) have the 
ability to more adroitly manage and absorb the losses associated with the 
intervention.  
By examining deficiency judgments solely in the context of residential 
properties, this Article highlights the inequitable risk allocation between 
borrowers and lenders9 and argues for the broad adoption of anti-deficiency 
legislation.  The deficiency judgment remedy is not new,10 and neither is the 
practice of lenders vigorously pursuing such judgments in times of economic 
crisis.  Even with this extensive history, the debate over whether deficiency 
judgments are an appropriate and efficient remedy is far from resolved.11  
                                                                                                                                   
6. For example, California’s statutes fail to provide sufficient protection to defaulting 
borrowers in that there is no retroactive protection afforded to refinanced residential loans entered 
into prior to January 1, 2013.  See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b(c) (West 2011 & Supp. 2014). 
7. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 3, at 501–02 (arguing that American banks deceived 
borrowers when they sold subprime mortgages to families who could not afford them). 
8. See, e.g., John Mixon, Deficiency Judgments Following Home Mortgage Foreclosure: An 
Anachronism that Increases Personal Tragedy, Impedes Regional Economic Recovery, and Means 
Little to Lenders, 22 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 11 (1991) (“Mortgage lenders as a class have more 
money and power than borrowers.”). 
9. See John Mixon & Ira B. Shepard, Antideficiency Relief for Foreclosed Homeowners: 
ULSIA Section 511(b), 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 455, 460 (1992) (citing Requirements for Single 
Family Mortgage Instruments, 54 Fed. Reg. 27,596, 27,608 n.6 (June 29, 1989)) (“Home mortgage 
documentation ordinarily assigns the entire risk of market decline . . . to the buyer.”). 
10. The widespread use of the deficiency judgment remedy to the detriment of depression era 
homeowners was one of the motivating factors for the California anti-deficiency statutes introduced 
in the 1930s. See Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 542 P.2d 981, 988–90 (citations omitted) (providing a 
history of anti-deficiency legislation in California).   
11. See, e.g., Grant Nelson & Gabriel D. Serbulea, Strategic Defaulters Versus the Federal 
Taxpayer: A Brief for the Preemption of State Anti-Deficiency Law for Residential Mortgagees, 66 
ARK. L. REV. 65, 91–97 (2013) (citations omitted) (arguing that the federal government should 
adopt recourse legislation to stymie what they view as the growing frequency of strategic 
defaulters); Rachel D. Godsil & David V. Simunovich, Protecting Status: The Mortgage Crisis, 
Eminent Domain, and the Ethics of Homeownership, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 949, 951 (2008) 
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Indeed, the federal government and various states are simultaneously exploring 
whether they should implement more extensive measures to protect consumers in 
their transactions with ordinary and predatory lenders, or whether broad recourse 
legislation should be adopted as a necessary antidote to strategic defaults.12  This 
piece takes the position that mortgagors should be shielded from deficiency 
judgments.  The impetus for this work is several-fold.  The character and depth 
of the Great Recession has exposed the vulnerability of the mortgage 
consumer,13 and the economic crisis highlights that federal and state laws are 
                                                                                                                                   
(arguing that government intervention is necessary to preserve homeownership and to protect 
consumers).  
12. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, AUD-
2013—001, FHFA’S OVERSIGHT OF THE ENTERPRISES’ EFFORTS TO RECOVER LOSSES FROM 
FORECLOSURE SALES (2012), [hereinafter FHFA Report] available at 
http://origin.www.fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/AUD-2013-001.pdf.  The FHFA Report concludes: 
 
Recovering losses from strategic defaulters and others who have the ability to repay their 
financial obligations—e.g., real estate investors and vacation home owners—presents an 
opportunity for the Enterprises to strengthen their financial positions and to reduce the 
need for future taxpayer support. 
Id. at 14. The FHFA Report also recommends: 
 
1. Routinely obtain deficiency-related information, such as the size of 
the Enterprises’ deficiencies, their effectiveness in targeting for 
deficiency collection defaulting borrowers who continue to have the 
ability to repay their loans, the number or amount of their collection 
referrals, and their recovery rate. 
 
2. Based on an analysis of deficiency data from Recommendation 1, 
incorporate deficiency management into FHFA’s supervisory 
review process. 
  
3. Issue written guidance to the Enterprises on managing their 
deficiency collection processes, including at a minimum whether 
they should be pursuing the same type of defaulted borrowers and 
pursuing collections in the same states. 
 
Id. at 15. See also Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
(Regulation X), 78 Fed. Reg. 10,696, 10,696 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024); 
Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 10,902, 
10,902 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026) (providing an official interpretation of 
regulations implementing provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act); Lew Sichelman, Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac to Go After More Strategic Defaulters, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 13, 2013, http://www. 
chicagotribune.com/business/bizwrap/la-fi-lew-20131013-story.html (discussing recommendations 
by the Office of the Inspector General at the Federal Housing Agency for Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac to pursue deficiency judgments more aggressively). 
13. See Singer, supra note 3, at 501 (“The banks made huge amounts of money marketing 
mortgages to people who could not afford to pay them back while offloading the risks of such deals 
onto hapless third parties.”). 
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inadequate to protect mortgagors.14  Government’s failure to implement 
legislation that addresses the relative disadvantages of the mortgage consumer in 
the context of a loan transaction has repercussions for the financial well-being of 
the country.15  This Article is prompted by a concern that the lending industry 
will continue to vigorously pursue collecting on deficiency judgments thereby 
effectively incapacitating borrowers who are financially strained.  Rather than 
ignoring the danger that the secondary market in deficiency judgments will 
flourish, which will contribute to the widening gap between the lending industry 
and the practical realities and issues confronting borrowers, this Article seeks to 
intervene to propose a more efficient approach towards the attendant risks of the 
residential mortgage loan.  Finally, this piece seeks to offer an alternative to 
recent scholarship advocating for the government’s adoption of recourse as the 
default for all residential mortgages.16  The scholarship maintains that bold 
moves like nationwide enactment of recourse laws are necessary in order to 
discourage mortgagors who strategically suspend making payments on their 
mortgage loans and leave their properties even though they have the financial 
means to continue paying the loan debt.17  These scholars argue that despite 
casting a wide net that will likely capture borrowers who do not have the 
financial resources to pay, their approach is necessary in order to protect federal 
taxpayers who ultimately shoulder the financial burden when the government 
acts to protect defaulting borrowers from foreclosure and personal liability 
judgments.18  Recognizing that defaulting mortgagors are also taxpayers, this 
Article draws a different conclusion, that mortgage consumers need more 
protection, not less.  There are other measures that can be implemented by banks 
and governments to manage the risk of strategic defaults.19 
                                                                                                                                   
14. See id. at 503 (“The bankers appear to have assumed that subprime mortgages were 
lawful because no law specifically prohibited them.”). 
15. See id. at 510. 
16. See Nelson & Serbulea, supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
17. See, e.g., id. at 91 (“Strategic defaulting has the potential to make matters much 
worse . . . Congress should preempt state law and make all residential mortgages recourse.”). 
18. Drawing upon the empirical research of Andra Ghent and Marianna Kudlyak, regarding 
the responsiveness of borrowers in certain income brackets to the threat of deficiency judgments, 
Grant S. Nelson and Gabriela D. Serbulea argue that Congress should enact a recourse statute that 
should be retroactive to the time the legislation goes into effect. See id. at 68; see also id. at 98 
(“Where there has been intervention by states in the mortgage crisis, it has largely been regulatory 
and, in the long run, arguably financially counterproductive for federal taxpayers . . . [because] such 
legislation creates a transfer payment from lenders to defaulting borrowers in the form of free rent 
for the moratoria period.” (quoting Grant S. Nelson, Confronting the Mortgage Meltdown: A Brief 
for the Federalization of State Mortgage Foreclosure Law, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 583, 609 (2010))). 
19. See, e.g., Debra Pogrund Stark, Unmasking the Predatory Loan in Sheep’s Clothing: A 
Legislative Proposal, 21 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 129, 130–31 (2005) (proposing a mortgage 
counseling law); Hughes, supra note 3, at 145 (proposing that lenders “refrain from entering into 
mortgage transactions with borrowers who fail to demonstrate the requisite ability to comprehend 
the lender’s disclosures”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for 
Mortgage Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and 
2014] REALLOCATING RISK AND DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT LIABILITY 249 
This paper references mortgage laws in California, Florida, and Illinois to 
help clarify the type of anti-deficiency legislation needed.20  These geographic 
regions represent a range of possibilities regarding real estate characteristics, 
buyers, and markets.  California, as a non-recourse state and pioneer in anti-
deficiency legislation, serves as an interesting point of contrast to the recourse 
states for several reasons, such as its size and share of the residential real estate 
market.  The inflated real estate values of the California market also provide 
important source material in terms of the monetary amount of the deficiencies 
for situations in which lenders have been permitted to recover personal 
judgments— for example, on refinanced loans.  California serves as a critical 
source of information regarding whether the presence of anti-deficiency 
legislation invites strategic defaults in noticeable excessive margins as compared 
to those states that don’t have anti-deficiency statutes.  Florida, as the site of a 
substantial increase in deficiency judgment activity, presents an interesting case 
study.21  While Florida has some protections in place for mortgagors, they are 
not extensive enough.22  Due to its warm climate, Florida is an attractive location 
for an eclectic mix of potential loan defaulters, such as second home vacation 
purchasers, retirees, first time home purchasers, longstanding homeowners, and 
investors.23  The proposal to apply anti-deficiency laws to this diverse home 
buying population raises the question of whether the profile of the homebuyer 
should factor in the decision of granting non-recourse protection. Illinois is 
included not only because of its location in the Midwest, but also because this 
state contains one of the most expensive real estate markets—that is Chicago—
as well as regions with lower real estate values.24  The state encompasses 
agricultural land and urban areas and has been the site of significant industrial 
development.25  Further, recent occurrences in Illinois suggest that a shift is 
underway from protecting mortgage loan consumers judicially, rather than 
legislatively.26  Although Illinois does not have an anti-deficiency  
                                                                                                                                   
Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV. 1083, 1165 (1984) (proposing federal disclosure requirements 
that “more accurately reflect the total costs and risks of the loan”). 
20. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b (West 2011 & Supp. 2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 45.031 (West 2006 & Supp. 2014); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15 (2012). 
21. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, House is Gone but Debt Lives On, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 
2011, at A1. 
22. Florida has a fair value statute. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 45.031(7) (West 2006 & Supp. 
2014).  
23. See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 21. 
24. Caitlin Wilson, The Average Illinois Home Price is Very . . . Average, REBOOT ILLINOIS 
(June 9, 2014) available at http://www.rebootillinois.com/2014/06/09/editors-picks/caitlinwilson/ 
illinois-home-price/10073/. 
25. See id. 
26. See The Honorable Mathias W. Delort, Assoc. Judge, Cook Cnty. Cir. Ct. Keynote 
Address at the University of Northern Illinois Law Review Symposium: The Mortgage Foreclosure 
Crisis (Apr. 20, 2012); see also Andra C. Ghent & Marianna Kudlyak, Recourse and Residential 
Mortgage Default: Evidence from U.S States, 24 REV. OF FINANCIAL STUD. 3159, 3179 (2011) 
(stating “a judge may opt not to confirm the sale on grounds that ‘justice was not otherwise done. In 
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statute,27 judges have historically28 engaged in the practice of routinely 
“denying” or discouraging motions for deficiency decrees.  There is evidence to 
suggest that Illinois judges are moving away from this practice.29  California, 
Florida, and Illinois have some of the highest foreclosure rates in the nation.30  
These states would benefit from either the adoption of anti-deficiency legislation 
or an expansion of the legislation that is already in place.  
In making the case for anti-deficiency legislation, this Article proceeds in 
the following manner.  Section II provides background information on 
deficiency judgments and the problems they pose. Section III examines the state 
of the law in California, Illinois, and Florida and gives historical background on 
anti-deficiency measures.  Section IV presents arguments in favor of enacting 
anti-deficiency legislation in those states that don’t currently have such 
protective measures and expanding the coverage of the law, where needed, in 
those states that do.  Section V analyzes and critiques the main arguments that 
have been offered against providing anti-deficiency protection to borrowers.  The 
counterarguments fall into several categories.  Opponents of pro-consumer 
mortgage laws emphasize the sanctity of the contract and argue that imposing 
remedies that were not bargained for undermine the loan contract31 as a reliable 
vehicle to structure relationships and outcomes, thereby causing instability in the 
market—for example, an increase in strategic defaults—and in future 
                                                                                                                                   
practice, this means that the granting of a deficiency judgment is at the discretion of the judge and 
judges rarely grant deficiency judgments on residential property”). 
27. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1101 to -1706 (2012). 
28. The Honorable Mathias W. Delort, Assoc. Judge, Cook County Circuit Court in Chicago, 
Keynote Address at the University of Northern Illinois Law Review Symposium: The Mortgage 
Foreclosure Crisis (Apr. 20, 2012). 
29. Id. 
30. A legislative report to the recent bill amending Florida’s foreclosure statute notes that at 
the close of 2012 “[s]even out of the top 10 highest foreclosure markets in the nation [were] in 
Florida,” and there were approximately “305,766 properties in some stage of foreclosure or bank-
owned.” FLA. H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS: MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES, H.B. 87, at 2 (2013) (citing 1.8 
Million Properties with Foreclosure Filings in 2012, REALTYTRAC (Jan. 14, 2013), 
http://www.realtytrac.com/content/foreclosure-market-report/2012-year-end-foreclosure-market-
report-7547). In Illinois, “at the end of 2010 there were 70,000 pending foreclosure cases in Cook 
County . . . . At the end of January [2013], there were 77,000 cases pending in Cook County Circuit 
Court.” Mary Ellen Podmolik, New Rules to Govern Illinois Foreclosures, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 22, 
2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-02-22/business/ct-biz-0222-mortgage-rules--
20130222_1_illinois-foreclosures-mortgage-servicers-foreclosure-process.  
31. See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby, Home Ownership Risk Beyond a Subprime Crisis: The Role 
of Delinquency Management, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2261, 2267 (2008) (“Building a society of 
home owners generally requires mortgage market development, which in turn is premised on a 
reliable system of contract enforcement against borrowers who default.”); Eric L. Talley, Contract 
Renegotiation, Mechanism Design and the Liquidated Damages Rule, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1195, 1196 
(1994) (noting the dissolution of contractual freedom in judicial non-enforcement of liquidated 
damages clauses); Mixon, supra note 8, at 9 (pointing out that “[t]raditional analysis holds the 
obligation to repay the mortgage is absolute, and the mortgaged property is merely pledged to 
ensure repayment”). 
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transactions.32  They maintain that from a moral and ethical standpoint, 
individuals should be held accountable for the deals they make and should be 
required to follow the terms of a transaction without variation regardless of any 
intervening factors, such as job loss, financial crises, or illness.33  They reason 
that because borrowers are responsible for assessing the risks associated with 
their home purchases they should bear the losses just as they enjoy the benefits.34  
Rather than resorting to non-recourse legislation, which limits the remedies 
available to lenders, this camp promotes other consumer protective approaches.35  
Finally, challengers to anti-deficiency laws maintain that placing restrictions on 
the lender’s ability to recover outstanding debt encumbers the foreclosure 
process making it inefficient36 and leads to substantial increases in the price of 
mortgage loan products, which in turn effectively prohibits certain segments of 
the population—for example middle and lower income classes—from obtaining 
financing.37  In short, lenders will be discouraged from providing mortgage loans 
to those groups.  Section VI offers a proposal for drafters of anti-deficiency 
legislation and argues that the statute should be applied retroactively to those 
residential mortgage loans entered into starting January 1, 2006.38  
                                                                                                                                   
32. See, e.g., Mixon, supra note 8, at 46 (noting that mortgagees favor maintaining the option 
of deficiency judgments, even when collecting on those judgments often produces no significant 
economic benefit, because of the perception that they serve as an effective deterrent to potential 
strategic defaulters).  
33. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 3, at 141 (“If we relieve individuals of the obligation to 
stand by their commitments, we diminish the individual and we diminish the collective strength of 
our society by eliminating our ability [to] prudently to rely upon each other for the mutual 
fulfillment of promises.”). 
34. See id. at 120–21 (citing Robert M. Washburn, The Judicial and Legislative Response to 
Price Inadequacy in Mortgage Foreclosure Sales, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 843, 873 (1980)).  
35. See, e.g., Stark, supra note 19, at 130–31 (advocating a “mortgage counseling law” to 
offset the practices of predatory lenders).  
36. See, e.g., James Geoffrey Durham, In Defense of Strict Foreclosure: A Legal and 
Economic Analysis of Mortgage Foreclosure, 36 S.C. L. REV. 461, 482 (1985) (“A mortgagee’s 
ability to recover a deficiency judgment against the mortgagor . . . affects . . . the efficiency of 
foreclosure by sale.”).  
37. But see Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. 
L. REV. 489, 490 n.4 (1991) (“Mortgagor protection laws may redistribute income from wealthy and 
middle-income homebuyers to those who are less fortunate.”).  
38. While there are conflicting opinions and data regarding the “beginning” of the financial 
crisis, January 1, 2006, was selected because the weight of evidence suggests that certain risky 
residential lending practices became more prevalent during 2006. This justifies the date as a 
reference point for the retroactive period of the proposal advocated herein. See Chairman Ben S. 
Bernanke, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the Federal Reserve System 
Conference on Housing and Mortgage Markets (Dec. 4, 2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20081204a.htm (“Delinquency rates for 
subprime mortgages—especially those with adjustable interest rates—began to climb steeply around 
the middle of 2006.”); see also Carol Necole Brown, Women and Subprime Lending: An Essay 
Advocating Self-Regulation of the Mortgage Lending Industry, 43 IND. L. REV. 1217, 1217–18 
(2010) (“Subprime mortgages as a share of the total number of loan originations were twenty 
percent in 2006, up from only nine percent in 1996.” (citing Katalina M. Bianco, The Subprime 
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II. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM 
A. What is a Mortgage Loan Deficiency? 
If a borrower defaults and the lender or holder of the note chooses to sue on 
the note or chooses to foreclose on the security, that is the borrower’s house, the 
total obtained by placing a levy on the borrower’s assets or the resulting 
foreclosure sale may yield an amount that is less than what the borrower owes on 
his mortgage.39  This difference is referred to as a deficiency.40  In the latter 
scenario, if the borrower is not living in a non-recourse state and if there is no 
anti-deficiency statute in place, the lender may pursue the defaulting borrower by 
obtaining a personal judgment for the deficiency including any expenses the 
foreclosing mortgagee has incurred in connection with the foreclosure.41  For 
example, if the borrower owes $200,000 on his mortgage loan and the mortgaged 
property sells for $100,000 at the foreclosure sale, then—assuming there are no 
restrictions imposed by the state’s laws or in the terms of the loan—the lender 
can obtain a deficiency decree in the amount of the $100,000 difference.  If the 
lender chooses to take this course of action, it often results in a set of 
economically disadvantageous consequences for the borrower.  In general, 
because deficiency judgments are related to an expensive asset relative to 
personal income and other property an individual is likely to acquire in his 
lifetime, deficiency judgments are often financially unmanageable for the 
average person.42  A foreclosure already damages the defaulted borrower’s 
credit.43  When a personal liability judgment is added to this circumstance, it 
often results in the borrower filing for bankruptcy in order to obtain relief.44  A 
deficiency judgment can impact the amount of take home pay that the debtor has 
at his disposal because his wages may be garnished in some jurisdictions by as 
                                                                                                                                   
Lending Crisis: Causes and Effects of the Mortgage Meltdown, CCH 1, 6 (2008), 
http://business.cch.com/bankingfinance/focus/news/subprime_wp_rev.pdf)). 
39. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8 (1997).  
40. See DENISE L. EVANS & O. WILLIAM EVANS, THE COMPLETE REAL ESTATE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 125 (2007) (defining “deficiency” as “[t]he amount due on a mortgage loan after 
adding all expenses of foreclosure and accrued interest to the principal balance of the loan and then 
deducting the sale price or lender-bid price for the property.”). 
41. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.4 (1997). 
42. The Wall Street Journal reports that $100,000 was the “average amount” of the 
deficiency in seven states examined. Silver-Greenberg, supra note 21, at A1. 
43. John Murphy, Deficiency Judgments—Another Blow to the Housing Market in the 
Future, JOHN MURPHY REPORTS (Apr. 4, 2011), http://johnmurphyreports.com/2011/04/04/ 
deficiency-judgments-another-blow-to-the-housing-market-in-the-future. 
44. A deficiency judgment may be discharged in a personal bankruptcy action because the 
debt is unsecured. See Mixon, supra note 8 at 29. As discussed in Section V of this Article, some 
scholars have noted the positive aspects of bankruptcy, which can help a mortgagor who is 
experiencing financial difficulties keep her home or delay a foreclosure to allow sufficient time to 
dampen the harsh disruptive effects that can accompany it—for example, temporary homelessness. 
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much as twenty-five percent.45  A deficiency judgment may also hinder the 
defaulting borrower’s ability to secure alternative housing in the future and could 
affect a borrower’s future job prospects if employers run a credit check and 
factor the state of a job applicant’s credit into their hiring decisions.46  In a 
worst-case scenario, a person subjected to a deficiency judgment might find 
himself facing prison.47  
There are other reasons to be concerned about allowing lenders to pursue 
deficiency judgments.  The availability of this remedy has widespread effects on 
the economy and on the stability of the housing market.48  A deficiency 
judgment financially constrains a borrower who is already experiencing 
substantial financial difficulties.49  Borrowers in this position are unable to fully 
participate in the economy because they do not have the economic means to do 
so.50  Further, the psychological effect of deficiency judgments on borrowers 
may keep them out of the market.51  If borrowers perceive that the purchase and 
financing of a house is a heavily rigged game that they cannot win, they will be 
reluctant to purchase real estate in the future.52  For as long as the lesson that real 
estate is no longer a “sure bet” remains in the psyche of U.S. culture, it could 
impact how generations coming of age as adults—that is, potential home 
                                                                                                                                   
45. See Murphy, supra note 43. 
46. While a consideration of a person’s credit status may not be permitted under U.S. laws, it 
does not preclude the possibility that employers may engage in this behavior. If, in fact, the credit 
score of a person plays a role in a decision not to hire someone, it is difficult to prove.  
47. See Molly McDonough, Payday Lenders Using Courts to Create Modern-Day Debtors’ 
Prisons in Missouri, Critics Say, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 20, 2012), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/payday_lenders_using_courts_to_create_modern_day_debt
ors_prisons/ (quoting Jim Gallagher, Payday Lenders Use Courts to Create Modern Debtors’ 
Prison, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 19, 2012, 5:52 PM), 
http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/payday-lenders-use-courts-to-create-modern-debtor-s-
prison/artcle_f56ca6aa-e880-11e1-b154-0019bb30f31a.html); Megan McArdle, America’s Modern-
Day Debtor’s Prison, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 23, 2011, 12:15 AM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/11/americas-modern-day-debtors-prison/249043/ 
(quoting Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Debtor Arrests Criticized, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 22, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970203710704577052373900992432#printMo
de). To be clear, a jail sentence would likely be imposed because of the individual’s failure to 
appear in court on the matter of payment of his debt and not because of the actual failure to pay the 
debt. If the debtor refused to appear, the court may choose to issue a body attachment order. 
Nonetheless, given that a substantial number of defaulting borrowers are in a precarious financial 
condition, the imposing force of the collector and the sense of doom a borrower may experience 
when being summoned to court by their creditor may lead some to make the unwise decision to 
ignore the summons because they cannot pay. Thus, one can conclude that there may be a disturbing 
relationship between the new rise in debtor’s prisons and deficiency judgments obtained in 
connection with mortgage foreclosures.  
48. See Murphy, supra note 43. 
49. See id. 
50. See id. 
51. See HART RESEARCH ASSOC., HOW HOUSING MATTERS: AMERICANS’ ATTITUDES 
TRANSFORMED BY THE HOUSING CRISIS & CHANGING LIFESTYLES 3 (2013) (finding that buying a 
home has become less appealing for more than half of adults surveyed). 
52. See id. 
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purchasers—view the house asset.53  Society has often privileged 
homeownership as a premier wealth accumulation vehicle.54  While recent events 
suggest that rethinking the privileged place of homeownership in the American 
economy and psyche is warranted,55 it is important not to automatically abandon 
the house as a vehicle for individuals to accumulate wealth over time56 
particularly since there are no apparent suitable alternatives.57  Instead, it is 
necessary to reevaluate the positioning of mortgage consumers in relation to 
lenders to ensure that the former are well informed before entering into a 
mortgage loan and that the risks they are undertaking, given the cost of the 
property, are not unduly assigned to them.  If states continue to allow deficiency 
judgments, the remedy can have rippling negative effects on the U.S. economy 
impacting the construction, purchase, and sale of houses.58  
                                                                                                                                   
53. Conversely, one could assert that as long as housing prices and financing is relatively low 
compared to the cost of renting, many people will make the decision to purchase homes even if 
there is a risk that they may default, lose their home, and face a judgment of personal liability for 
any outstanding loan debt that is not covered by the foreclosure sale proceeds.  
54. See William M. Rohe & Harry L. Watson, Introduction: Homeownership in American 
Culture and Public Policy, in CHASING THE AMERICAN DREAM: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON 
AFFORDABLE HOMEOWNERSHIP 1, 4–5 (William M. Rohe & Harry L. Watson eds., 2007). 
55. Substantial scholarship reevaluating home ownership has already been initiated.  See, 
e.g., Stephanie M. Stern, Reassessing the Citizen Virtues of Homeownership, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 
890, 938 (2011) (arguing that alternatives to homeownership do not have a detrimental effect on 
citizen values); Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 
107 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1096–97 (2009) (arguing that ownership of property is not a prerequisite 
to human flourishing); Jacoby, supra note 31, at 2262 (pointing out that commitment to 
homeownership should not be taken lightly); Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1047, 1049 (2008) (discussing the downsides of concentrating on homeownership as a primary 
investment strategy); D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
255, 255 (2006) (analyzing differences in treatment between “homes” and other types of property). 
56. See Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 11, at 953 (arguing for the preservation of 
homeownership provided that policy and laws are revised to take into account larger economic 
issues). 
57. Some may argue that the stock market is an acceptable alternative, but the market also 
carries substantial risks that many people do not appreciate. There is nothing comparable to the 
multi-functional aspects of the home, which provides individuals with a place to live and gives them 
an investment that may allow them to preserve their money, and the potential for their wealth to 
grow.  
58. According to a recent study, commissioned by the MacArthur Foundation, on individual 
attitudes towards housing, the economic crisis has led to significant changes in how individuals 
perceive homeownership. The study reveals that “seven in 10 (69%) believe it is less likely for 
families to build equity and wealth through homeownership today compared with two or three 
decades ago . . . [and] four in five (81%) saying that it is more likely today for banks to foreclose on 
homeowners than it was 20 or 30 years ago.” HART RESEARCH ASSOC., supra note 51, at 10. While 
the increased awareness of individuals regarding the possibility of foreclosure is positive because it 
indicates that people are more accurately assessing the risks accompanying homeownership, there 
are potential negatives to discouraging individuals from purchasing homes. If the disincentives to 
homeownership prevail, this climate creates a crisis with respect to the current structure that is in 
place, which is dependent upon individuals continuing to buy homes. Will there be enough buyers 
for current homeowners who wish to sell? There will be growing pains if indeed the United States is 
transitioning from a homeownership society to a rental one. The move away from real property 
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B. Types of Foreclosure and Deficiency Judgments 
The three types of foreclosure procedures available to mortgagees in the 
United States are judicial sale;59 power of sale, also known as non-judicial sale;60 
and strict foreclosure.61  A common method of foreclosure in many states, 
including California,62 Florida,63 and Illinois64 is by judicial sale.65  A judicial 
sale foreclosure is the procedure according to which a mortgagee can file an 
action for a “court-ordered sale of the mortgaged property after a default by the 
                                                                                                                                   
residential ownership leaves a void regarding available pathways to advance economically within 
society. On the other hand, borrowers may be more resilient than this trend suggests. There is some 
evidence that even those borrowers who have been stung by the financial downturn, losing their 
homes to foreclosure, have rebounded in some states and opted to enter the home buyer’s market 
again. These so-called “boomerang” buyers are contributing to the escalation of home prices in 
Phoenix and California; although, investors are the primary force behind the rise of prices in those 
states. Catherine Reagor, Phoenix Housing Market Sees “Boomerang Buyers” Sooner Than 
Expected, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (July 14, 2014, 1:14 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/business/ 
realestate/articles/20130709phoenix-housing-market-boomerang-buyers.html. This phenomenon 
can largely be explained by the continuation of historically low interest rates, depressed home 
prices, and some forgiving lenders who are willing to make credit available. In some markets the 
entry of new groups—for example, immigrant communities—has also helped to spark growth. See 
John Feinblatt & Jason Marczak, Immigrants Are Driving the Housing Recovery, CNN (July 13, 
2013, 8:53 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/19/opinion/feinblatt-housing-immigration/. 
59. See GRANT S. NELSON ET AL., REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 612 (8th ed. 2009). (“The most pervasive method [of foreclosure] is 
judicial foreclosure in equity accompanied by a judicial sale. This type of foreclosure is available in 
every state, and in many states it is the only type of foreclosure permitted.”). 
60. Under a power of sale foreclosure, a mortgagee is permitted to “force a sale of the 
mortgaged property without bringing a judicial action.” Durham, supra note 36, at 477–78.  For a 
detailed explanation of the power of sale foreclosure method, see GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. 
WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 633–36 (5th ed. 2007) (citations omitted). Not all 
jurisdictions authorize mortgagees to use the power of sale method. Illinois, for example, does not 
allow power of sale foreclosures. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1405 (2012) (“No real estate 
within this State may be sold by virtue of any power of sale contained in a mortgage or any other 
agreement, and all such mortgages may only be foreclosed in accordance with [the Illinois 
Mortgage Foreclosure Law]).  
61. See NELSON ET AL., supra note 59, at 612–13 (“Under [the strict foreclosure method,] 
foreclosure is in court, but there is no judicial sale. Instead the defaulting mortgagor is given a 
period of time by the court to pay the mortgage debt. Failure to do so within that time period will 
result in the mortgaged property vesting in the mortgagee without sale.”). Of the three states that 
this Article examines, only Illinois provides for strict foreclosure. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-
1403 (2012) (“Nothing in this Article shall affect the right of a mortgagee to foreclose its mortgage 
by a common law strict foreclosure as in existence in Illinois on the effective date of this Article.”). 
62. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726 (West 1980 & Supp. 2014). 
63. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 702.01 (West 1994 & Supp. 2014). 
64. In Illinois, mortgagees are required to utilize judicial foreclosure. See 735 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/15-1404 (2012).  
65. Approximately forty percent of the states use the judicial foreclosure method. See 
NELSON ET AL., supra note 59, at 614; see also Durham, supra note 36, at 476 (“Judicial foreclosure 
is the primary method of foreclosure in at least twenty-five states.” (citing G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON 
& D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 7.11 at 446 (1979))).  
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mortgagor.”66  Given the popularity of judicial sale foreclosures, its use in the 
jurisdictions this Article highlights, and the restrictions that are often placed on 
deficiency judgments if mortgagees opt to pursue foreclosure via one of the other 
procedures,67 this paper focuses on the judicial sale.68  If the mortgagee chooses 
this popular mechanism, and the jurisdiction’s laws otherwise permit, the 
mortgagee has the option of suing for a deficiency judgment if the foreclosure 
sale price does not cover the full amount of the borrower’s outstanding debt.69 
C. Scope of the Problem 
The threat of a lender or other collector obtaining a deficiency judgment is a 
viable one that merits attention.70  A majority of states provide for a deficiency 
judgment remedy in connection with judicial foreclosures.71  In 2011, “64% of 
the 4.5 million foreclosures since the start of 2007 have taken place in states that 
allow deficiency judgments.”72  This statistic means that there is potential for a 
substantial rise in deficiency judgment suits.  Although the circumstances under 
which a deficiency judgment will be granted may be limited, if the mortgagee73 
chooses to rely upon the judicial foreclosure process, the deficiency judgment 
remedy is available in California,74 
                                                                                                                                   
66. Durham, supra note 36, at 476.  
67. See NELSON ET AL., supra note 59, at 615 (noting that “in some jurisdictions, deficiency 
judgments are unavailable after power of sale foreclosure”). California does not permit the 
mortgagee to obtain a deficiency judgment if power of sale is the method of foreclosure. See CAL. 
CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(d) (West 2011 & Supp. 2014). In Illinois, after a decree has been awarded 
to a lender through strict foreclosure, the lender may not pursue a deficiency judgment. See Debra 
Pogrund Stark, Facing the Facts: An Empirical Study of the Fairness and Efficiency of 
Foreclosures and a Proposal for Reform, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 639, 647–48 (1997). 
68. While this Article does not analyze the alternative procedures in depth, the arguments 
pertain equally well to those jurisdictions that allow the mortgagee to pursue deficiency judgments 
when using the other methods of foreclosure.  
69. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 702.06 (West 1994 & Supp. 2014) (allowing request for 
deficiency judgment in foreclosure); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1504(f) (allowing a limited right to 
sue for deficiency). The deficiency judgment is limited in California. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 580(b) (West 2011 & Supp. 2014). 
70. See Sichelman, supra note 12; Silver-Greenberg, supra note 21, at A1, A12; Les Christie, 
You Lost Your House, but You Still Have to Pay, CNNMONEY.COM (Feb. 3, 2010, 3:21 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/03/real_estate/foreclosure_deficiency_judgement/. 
71. See Durham, supra note 36, at 482 & n.135 (citations omitted). 
72. Silver-Greenberg, supra note 21, at A1. 
73. In addition to lenders bringing personal liability deficiency actions against mortgagors, 
private mortgage insurers and government-controlled entities, such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, 
and debt collectors—investors who have purchased the debt—may also pursue foreclosed 
borrowers for deficiencies where the jurisdiction or the loan instruments allow them to do so.  See 
Sichelman, supra note 12 (noting that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can pursue borrowers for 
deficiency); see also Silver-Greenberg, supra note 21, at A12 (describing debt investors pursuing 
deficiency judgments).  
74. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726 (West 1980 & Supp. 2014). 
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Illinois,75 and Florida.76  Some may argue that because lenders secure deficiency 
judgments in only a relatively small number of the cases in which they are 
legally entitled to do so,77 the positives of having this remedy available to them 
to exercise at their discretion outweigh the negatives of when they opt to rely 
upon the remedy.  While the number of deficiency judgments obtained in 
connection with foreclosures over the past five years, from 2008–2013, may not 
have reached epidemic proportions, there is compelling evidence to suggest that 
a disturbing trend is emerging according to which lenders are relying more 
heavily upon this remedy.78  Florida has experienced a noticeable increase in 
deficiency judgment activity.  According to one report: 
In 2010, [Lee County, Florida] courts granted more than 270 deficiency 
judgments to lenders in a county that includes hard-hit Cape Coral and 
Fort Myers. That's five times more than in 2008.  This year [2011] is 
promising to be even more active, with 33 deficiency judgments granted 
in February, more than double the number from a year earlier.79 
Apparently, lenders are utilizing this remedy against both perceived strategic 
defaulters—that is, borrowers who have the financial means to continue paying 
their mortgages but choose not to80—and judgment proof borrowers—that is, 
borrowers who do not have the financial resources to pay their mortgage loan 
obligation. 
                                                                                                                                   
75. 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. 15/112 (2012); see also Bank of Benton v. Cogdill, 454 N.E.2d 
1120, 1126 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (citing Emerson v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 352 N.E.2d 45, 49 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1976); In re Folksdorf’s Estate, 26 N.E.2d 660, 662 (Ill. App. Ct. 1940)) (stating that “[t]he right 
to secure such a deficiency judgment in any foreclosure proceeding is clear, provided the mortgagee 
receives only one full satisfaction”).  
76. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 702.06 (West 1984 & 2014). 
77. In reporting on the results of her 1993–1994 empirical study on foreclosures in Illinois, 
legal scholar Debra Stark comments that, “[o]f the approximately 25% of the judicial sales cases in 
which a deficiency occurred, the lender pursued the deficiency in only 28.2% of such cases in the 
1993 sample and 12.9% of such cases in the 1994 sample.” Stark, supra note 19, at 664; see also 
Silver-Greenberg, supra note 21, at A12 (“Lenders still sue for loan shortfalls in only a small 
minority of cases where they legally could.”).  
78. See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 21, at A12. Silver-Greenberg states that there was a 
thirty-four percent increase in the number of deficiency judgments entered on the court records in 
2011 in Lee County, Florida, as compared to the previous year, for a total of 172 deficiency 
judgments in the first seven months of 2011. Id.; see also Camillo T. Melchiorre, A New Weapon in 
Default Servicing, MORTGAGE BANKING, Feb. 1, 1995 (“[L]enders, private mortgage insurers and 
government-sponsored enterprises have recognized that the practice of deficiency recoveries should 
be a routine part of conventional residential mortgage servicing.”). 
79. Kris Hundley, Deficiency Judgments Let Creditors Haunt Borrowers, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/deficiency-judgments-let-
creditors-haunt-borrowers-for-up-to-20-years/1160128. 
80. Section V of this Article addresses in more detail arguments regarding strategic defaulters 
as a justification for maintaining the deficiency judgment remedy. 
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Lenders are increasingly relying upon the remedy of deficiency judgments.81  
The likely reason for this shift is that the deficiencies remaining after a 
foreclosure sale are substantially greater due to the larger amounts that borrowers 
obtained to finance their purchases.82  The crisis of this decade is due, in 
substantial part, to the reckless practices of lenders who liberally extended large 
loans to home purchasers while simultaneously relaxing their underwriting 
requirements.83  As a result, more borrowers were able to receive complete 
financing, rather than placing the standard down payment of twenty to twenty-
five percent on their intended home purchase.84  Consequently, if those 
borrowers who relied on the lender to finance 95 to 100 percent of their 
purchases defaulted, the lender has to contend with greater shortfalls.85  Another 
factor may be the type of institution that is confronted with deficiencies.  
According to one news article, “[c]redit unions and smaller banks”86 are 
frequently making the calculated choice to seek recourse from a borrower on a 
defaulted loan.  Given some of the typical characteristics of these lending 
institutions, for example, duties to members in the case of the credit unions, 
responsibility to be more risk averse, less capitalized, not as many avenues for 
spreading their risk as big commercial lenders, the connection between the 
bank’s solvency and community development, and the smaller scale of lending 
in which they engage,87 it makes sense that these institutions would conclude 
that it would be a financially unsound decision not to obtain personal liability 
judgments against borrowers when confronted with sizeable deficiencies 
following foreclosures.  However, if credit unions are dedicated to providing 
services and loans to people who cannot readily obtain such resources from 
larger banks (e.g. lower-income communities), the fact that these institutions are 
                                                                                                                                   
81. See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 21, at A1.  
82. See id. at A1. 
83. See Singer, supra note 3, at 507–08 (citing Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, 
Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 1177, 1180–82 (2012)); The Origins of the Financial 
Crisis: Crash Course, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/ 
schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-five-years-article; Steve Dening, 
Lest We Forget: Why We Had a Financial Crisis, FORBES (Nov. 22, 2011), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2011/11/22/5086/; Barry Ritholtz, What Caused the 
Financial Crisis? The Big Lie Goes Viral, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2011, 11:28 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/what-caused-the-financial-crisis-the-big-lie-goes-
viral/2011/10/31/gIQAXlSOqM_story_1.html. 
84. See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 21, at A1. 
85. See id. at A1. 
86. Id. at A12. 
87. See generally J. CARROLL MOODY & GILBERT C. FITE, THE CREDIT UNION MOVEMENT 
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 1850 TO 1980 (2d ed. 1984) (providing a history of the credit union 
movement); Scott E. Hein, Timothy W. Koch & Scott MacDonald, On the Uniqueness of 
Community Banks, FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REV., First Quarter 2005, at 15–36 
(discussing the community bank model, and the role of community banks); William Keeton, Jim 
Harvey, & Paul Willis, The Role of Community Banks in the U.S. Economy, FED. RES. BANK OF 
KANSAS CITY ECON. REV., Second Quarter 2003, at 15–43 (providing an overview of community 
banks in U.S.). 
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more likely to seek deficiency judgments against this same group means there is 
a danger that the people who are least likely to be able to manage a deficiency 
judgment are getting saddled with personal liability.88 
D. The Secondary Market 
An even more disturbing trend is the burgeoning secondary market in 
deficiency judgments.89  Debt collection companies are buying deficiency 
judgments for approximately “two cents on the dollar.”90  Investors in this type 
of debt are pursuing two courses of action.  Under one scenario, the lender 
obtains the deficiency judgments, and the investors buy the judgments to pursue 
on their own timetable capped only by state statutes.91  In other cases, investors 
acquire the note and obtain the deficiency judgment on their own.92  
Investors are willing to pay pennies on the dollar for deficiency judgments 
even if some of the judgments purchased are against judgment proof 
borrowers.93  Their strategy is to defer acting on the judgments, for as long as the 
state’s statute of limitation permits, with the intention of collecting at a later date 
when the debtor is in a better financial position.94  The typical twenty-year 
period that a mortgagee has to collect on the deficiency, once a personal liability 
judgment is issued,95 allows more than enough time for a defaulted mortgagor’s 
financial state to drastically change for the better.  When the investors factor in 
the interest that can accumulate over time on the debt,96 they deem the 
acquisition of this type of debt a bet worth making.  However, for the mortgagor-
debtor, the weight of the debt is overwhelming.  For this reason, it is imperative 
that anti-deficiency laws be enacted to help dismantle this growing market. 
                                                                                                                                   
88. This argument assumes that the credit unions are obtaining judgments against borrowers 
from traditionally underserved lower-income communities.  
89. See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 21, at A12. 
90. Id.  
91. See id. (explaining that investors sometimes buy deficiency judgments from lenders and 
noting the long time frame states allow for collecting on such judgments). 
92. See id. 
93. See id. (noting that one debt investor interviewed will buy bad mortgages, get deficiency 
judgments, and hold the judgments, even if borrowers are not currently in a position to pay). 
94. See id. 
95. With the recent passage of H.B. 87 in Florida, the time period for obtaining deficiency 
judgments has been substantially shortened for foreclosures after July 1, 2013. Kerri Ann Panchuk, 
Florida Governor Signs Bill to Speed up State’s Foreclosure Process, HOUSING WIRE (June 7, 
2013, 5:51 PM), http://www.housingwire.com/articles/florida-governor-signs-bill-speed-states-
foreclosure-process. For a discussion of lenders’ practices in Florida prior to the enactment of the 
new law, see Hundley, supra note 79 (discussing deficiency judgment practices in Florida). 
96. For example, in Illinois the interest rate on judgments is 9 percent per annum and runs 
from the date the judgment is entered until it is satisfied. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1303 
(2012). 
260 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 66: 243 
 
III. THE STATE OF THE LAW IN CALIFORNIA, ILLINOIS, AND FLORIDA 
A. California and the History of Anti-Deficiency Statutes—What Purposes 
Do the Statutes Serve? 
Anti-deficiency legislation emerged in the depression era of the 1930s.97  
California serves as an important source of information regarding the impetus 
and rationales for this type of legislation because it is a forerunner in crafting 
pro-mortgagor laws.98  As with today’s recession, during the 1930s depression, 
borrowers had to contend with falling property values, the lack of readily 
available credit, and a dearth of potential homebuyers.99  This confluence of 
factors created an unfair advantage for mortgagees in three essential ways.  First, 
borrowers were not able to easily refinance their properties to reduce their 
payments by trading their higher interest loans for lower interest ones.100  
Second, borrowers who found themselves in financial trouble were not able to 
sell their homes to avoid foreclosure.101  Third, in the event of foreclosure, 
because of the absence of a ready market of buyers, mortgagees could succeed in 
obtaining a “double recovery” by acquiring the mortgagor’s property at the 
foreclosure sale for a relatively insignificant amount compared to what the 
mortgagor paid, and then pursue the mortgagor for the difference between the 
foreclosure sale price and the outstanding debt.102  California implemented 
protective legislation for borrowers in recognition of the severe economic 
conditions that placed mortgagors in dire straits.103  California’s anti-deficiency 
statutes serve several specific goals: 
(1) to prevent a multiplicity of actions, (2) to prevent an overvaluation 
of the security, (3) to prevent the aggravation of an economic recession 
                                                                                                                                   
97. See Talbott v. Hustwit, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 703, 705 Ct. App. 2008) (“California’s 
statutes, . . . enacted during the depression, limit or prohibit lenders from obtaining personal 
judgments against borrowers where the lender's sale of real property security produces proceeds 
insufficient to cover the amount of the debt.”); see also Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 542 P.2d 981, 
988–90 (Cal. 1975) (citations omitted) (noting that California’s antideficiency statutes were passed 
during the Great Depression). 
98. See Cornelison, 542 P.2d at 988–90; see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. § 580b (West 2011 
& Supp. 2014) (providing limitations on deficiency judgments); Carol Burns, Comment, Will 
Refinancing Your Home Mortgage Risk Your Life Savings?: Refinancing and California Code of 
Civil Procedure Section 580B, 43 UCLA L. REV. 2077, 2081–82 (1996) (citations omitted) 
(discussing California’s enactment of anti-deficiency legislation in the 1930s).  
99. See Cornelison, 542 P.2d at 988. 
100. See id. (noting the lack of money available during the Depression). 
101. See id. (noting the lack of money available and the declining property values during the 
Depression). 
102. See id. (citing Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 378 P.2d 97, 99–100 (Cal. 1963)) (noting 
that, in a depression-era market, mortgagees could buy foreclosed properties cheaply, and pursue 
debtors for a deficiency).  
103. See Palm v. Schilling, 244 Cal. Rptr. 600, 604 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing Roseleaf Corp., 
378 P.2d at 99; Cornelison, 542 P.2d at 988–90). 
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which would result if [debtors] lost their property and were also 
burdened with personal liability, and (4) to prevent the creditor from 
making an unreasonably low bid at the foreclosure sale, acquire the 
asset below its value, and also recover a personal judgment against the 
debtor.104  
One California court summarized the effect of the state’s anti-deficiency 
laws, as properly “plac[ing] the risk of inadequate security on the purchase 
money mortgagee” regardless of whether this risk arises due to the mortgagee’s 
actions of improperly valuing the security or from an economic recession that 
results in the critical decline of home values.105 
The purposes served by California’s anti-deficiency legislation are relevant 
for all mortgagors.  The fundamental reasons for having these pro-consumer 
laws in place in California hold true today in recession prone times.  There are 
no absolutes on which consumers can rely.  The disadvantageous conditions for 
borrowers prevalent during the depression era enactment of California’s anti-
deficiency laws are still of concern today.  For this reason, it makes sense for 
states that do not have such pro-consumer measures to adopt them.  Now that the 
broad foundational reasons for adopting California’s anti-deficiency legislation 
have been identified, it is necessary to examine aspects of California’s statutes in 
more detail.  While overall California’s anti-deficiency laws are protective of 
mortgagors, they are lacking in certain respects, which are addressed in the 
following section.  
1. Types of Anti-Deficiency Statutes 
There are numerous provisions that fall under the category of anti-deficiency 
legislation.106  Generally, these laws may be categorized as statutes that prohibit 
deficiency judgments in certain types of loan transactions107 or foreclosures.108  
Examples of modifications to foreclosure procedures include fair value 
                                                                                                                                   
104. Cadlerock Joint Venture, L.P. v. Lobel, 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 96, 103 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(quoting Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Graves, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288, 290 n.3 (Ct. App. 
1996)); see also Cornelison, 542 P.2d at 990 (Cal. 1975) (“[P]rimary purpose of section 580b 
[barring deficiency] is, ‘in the event of a depression in land values, to prevent the aggravation of the 
downturn that would result if defaulting purchasers lost the land and were also burdened with 
personal liability.’” (quoting Bargioni v. Hill, 378 P.2d 593, 594 (Cal. 1963)).  
105. Crookall v. Davis, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 250, 255 (Ct. App. 1998). 
106. For a detailed discussion of various types of anti-deficiency laws, see Grant S. Nelson, 
Deficiency Judgments After Real Estate Foreclosures in Mississippi: Some Modest Proposals, 47 
MO. L. REV. 151, 152–154 (1982) (citations omitted).  
107. California prohibits deficiency judgments in purchase money transactions. See CAL. CIV. 
PROC. CODE § 580b(c) (West 2011 & Supp. 2014); see also Schill, supra note 37, at 494 (discussing 
different types of limits on deficiency judgments).  
108. See Schill, supra note 37, at 494–95. 
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limitations109 and one-action rules.110  The statutes provide varying degrees of 
protection and relief to mortgagors.  While the laws that fall short of an outright 
prohibition on deficiency judgments help to insulate borrowers to some degree, 
this Article argues that given the financial resources and adaptability of lenders 
and the inequities inherent to the mortgage loan transaction, deficiency 
judgments should be precluded from residential loan transactions.  They should 
not be part of the contractual terms bargained for by residential mortgagors and 
mortgagees. 
2. Aspects of California’s Provisions 
Value and price are linked, but they are not the same.111  Yet, the foreclosure 
sale price in relation to the outstanding mortgage loan balance is typically the 
measure used to determine whether there is a deficiency.112  According to the 
foreclosure laws in many states,113 the foreclosure sale price is the indicator of 
the value of the property.  This approach is problematic because there can be 
substantial gaps may exist between the price that is given in the context of the 
artificial foreclosure sale market and the value of a property as shaped by a wider 
range of factors, such as better market conditions, improvements made to the 
property, the overall condition of the property, and its location.114  The value is 
                                                                                                                                   
109. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580a (West 2011 & Supp. 2014) (placing a limit on 
the amount of a deficiency judgment based upon fair-market value of property); CAL. CIV. PROC. 
CODE § 726 (West 1980 & Supp. 2014) (limiting deficiency judgment based upon fair value of 
property). 
110. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726 (codifying California’s one-action rule). 
111. See NELSON ET AL., supra note 59, at 731 (stating that foreclosure sales, “even under 
stable economic conditions, normally will not bring a price that will reflect the reasonable market 
value of the property if it were marketed outside the foreclosure context”). 
112. This measurement is in accordance with the common law rule. The Reporter’s Note to 
The Restatement Third of the Law Comment a states: 
Several states continue to adhere to the common law rule that when a foreclosure 
sale does not yield at least the amount of the mortgage obligation, the mortgagee is 
entitled to a deficiency judgment measured by the difference between the foreclosure 
price and the mortgage obligation. Under this approach, the foreclosure sale price is the 
conclusive measure of the amount to be applied to the obligation unless the mortgagor 
can prove that the foreclosure process itself was defective. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.4 (1997).  
113. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-5-118(b) (Supp. 2013) (“The creditor shall be entitled 
to a rebuttable prima facie presumption that the sale price of the property is equal to the fair market 
value of the property at the time of the sale.”); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Holtzman, 618 N.E.2d 418, 
424 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (noting that Illinois courts should uphold the foreclosure sale and grant the 
deficiency judgment petition unless there is evidence of fraud, that the sale was unconscionable, or 
“justice was otherwise not done” (citing 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1508(b) (2012))). 
114. See, e.g., San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., Inc. v. 816 S. Figueroa Co., 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272, 
276–77 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726) (discussing “factors which should be 
considered in determining ‘fair value’”). 
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likely to be higher because it encompasses additional factors, whereas the price 
may not fully credit these items.  One approach for addressing the potential gap 
between value and price is implementing a corrective provision like the fair 
value limitation. California has two fair value statutes,115 one that pertains to 
judicial sale foreclosures and another that governs power-of-sale foreclosures.  
Typically, the foreclosure sale price is used as the measure to determine whether 
anything remains due and owing to the lender, after subtracting any fees and 
costs that the lender has incurred from the sale proceeds, and then applying the 
remainder to the loan balance.116  In contrast, under California’s judicial sales 
statute, the remainder amount is the difference between the fair value of the 
property and the outstanding amount.117 
Fair value limitations have functioned to discourage lenders from causing a 
deficiency by entering a low bid on the foreclosed property.118  Given that the 
mortgagee is often the only bidder at a foreclosure sale and is allowed to bid up 
to the amount of the outstanding debt, without actually having to pay money out 
of pocket,119 the mortgagee has an incentive to bid less than the fair value of the 
property, knowing that in those jurisdictions that permit it to do so, the 
mortgagee can pursue a deficiency judgment for any amount of the loan balance 
that was not covered by the sale proceeds.120  With the growing secondary 
market in mortgage loan deficiency collections, mortgagees may also be thinking 
that they can sell the deficiency judgment to a debt collector and make some 
                                                                                                                                   
115. Section 580a of the California Code of Civil Procedure provides for a fair value 
limitation in power of sale foreclosures. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580a (West 2011). Section 
726(b) provides for a fair value limitation in judicial sale foreclosures. See CAL. CIV. PROC. 
CODE § 726(b) (West 1980 & Supp. 2014). Section 726(b) provides in relevant part: 
 
In the event that a deficiency is not waived or prohibited and it is decreed that 
any defendant is personally liable for the debt, then upon application of the 
plaintiff filed at any time within three months of the date of the foreclosure 
sale and after a hearing thereon at which the court shall take evidence and at 
which hearing either party may present evidence as to the fair value of the real 
property or estate for years therein sold as of the date of sale, the court shall 
render a money judgment against the defendant or defendants for the amount 
by which the amount of the indebtedness with interest and costs of levy and 
sale and of action exceeds the fair value of the real property or estate for years 
therein sold as of the date of sale. In no event shall the amount of the 
judgment, exclusive of interest from the date of sale and of costs exceed the 
difference between the amount for which the real property or estate for years 
therein was sold and the entire amount of the indebtedness secured by the 
mortgage or deed of trust.  
 
Id.  
116. See NELSON ET AL., supra note 59, at 731. 
117. See Nelson, supra note 106, at 154 & n.12 (explaining that several states have fair value 
statutes, including California). 
118. See NELSON ET AL., supra note 59, at 731–32. 
119. See Stark, supra note 19, at 663–64. 
120. See id. at 664. 
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additional money on the loan if it is not worth their time and effort to pursue the 
foreclosed mortgagor.121  Unless a higher bidder is present at the foreclosure 
sale, the mortgagee has little incentive not to adopt the foregoing strategy.122  
The logic of the fair value statutes is that mortgagees will be motivated to bid a 
fair price if they know that they cannot, in essence, “create” a substantial 
deficiency by taking note of the outstanding debt and bidding lower than the fair 
value of the property, thereby ensuring there will be a notable gap between the 
remaining indebtedness amount and the foreclosure sale price.  
While fair value limitations are likely to be more protective of a mortgagor’s 
equity123 than relying upon the foreclosure sale price, they do not address the 
circumstance of dealing with a real estate market that has suffered a precipitous 
drop in value.  In this instance, the fair value of the property may be more than 
what the bidder offered at the foreclosure sale, but it remains likely, depending 
upon when the buyer made the purchase, that the fair value will still be 
substantially lower than what the buyer paid and borrowed to finance the 
purchase.  Under this circumstance, the mortgagor will still have to contend with 
the prospect of a hefty deficiency judgment.124  
A second aspect of California’s anti-deficiency provisions is the scope of the 
protective coverage.  There are two categories of particular concern: borrowers 
who refinance their mortgages and guarantors of the mortgage loan. After years 
of uncertainty regarding whether borrowers who refinanced their purchase 
money mortgages were entitled to anti-deficiency protection,125 a recent 
amendment to California’s Section 580b clarifies that such protections are 
extended under those circumstances.126  California’s amendment provides much 
                                                                                                                                   
121. See generally Silver-Greenberg, supra note 21, at A12 (“The increase in deficiency 
judgments has sparked a growing secondary market,” where a debt investor “buys banks’ soured 
mortgages and goes to court itself to get judgments for debt that remains after foreclosure sales.”). 
122. The inherent unfairness of this scenario is unlikely to be a sufficient deterrent to 
mortgagees.  
123. In some jurisdictions, if the fair value produces an excess of the amount owed to the 
lender and the lender is the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, the lender would not be able to benefit 
from any excess. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-10 (2010) (“[I]f there is any surplus, it must 
be brought into court subject to the order of the court.  If the surplus is less than one thousand 
dollars and an application to receive the surplus is not filed with the court within sixty days after 
deposit, the court shall order the funds forfeited to the general fund of the county.”). 
124. See Burns, supra note 98, at 2095–2103 (citations omitted) (discussing the uncertainty in 
case law regarding whether borrowers were entitled to anti-deficiency protection). 
125. See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 21, at A1. 
126. See SB-1069 Deficiency Judgments 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 64 codified as amended at 
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b (Supp. 2014)). The amended Section 580b provides in relevant part: 
 
(a) No deficiency judgment shall lie in any event for the following: 
(1) After a sale of real property or an estate for years therein for failure of the 
purchaser to complete his or her contract of sale. 
(2) Under a deed of trust or mortgage given to the vendor to secure payment 
of the balance of the purchase price of that real property or estate for years therein. 
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needed clarity to the term “purchase money mortgage,” which was not 
adequately defined under the original statute.127  Prior to the amendment, the 
lack of specificity deterred borrowers from operating in a logical, economically-
efficient manner.  Rather than acting to take advantage of prevailing lower 
interest rates or to replace an unconventional mortgage with a more conventional 
one, borrowers were motivated to stay in higher priced and, perhaps, riskier 
loans for fear of losing their protected non-recourse loan status.128  
The changes to California’s Section 580b are positive but they do not go far 
enough.  Amended Section 580b only applies to “credit transactions that are 
executed on or after January 1, 2013.”129  In contrast to California’s section 
580b, this Article’s proposal, as discussed in Section VI, offers retroactive 
coverage that would encompass borrowers who entered into residential mortgage 
loan contracts and refinancing loan contracts on January 1, 2006.  Moreover, the 
amendments to California’s anti-deficiency laws do not address the vulnerable 
position of guarantors of residential loans.130  A guarantor is defined as “one who 
                                                                                                                                   
(3) Under a deed of trust or mortgage on a dwelling for not more than four 
families given to a lender to secure repayment of a loan which was in fact used to 
pay all or part of the purchase price of that dwelling, occupied entirely or in part by 
the purchaser. 
(b) For purposes of subdivision (c), a loan described in paragraph (3) of 
subdivision (a) is a “purchase money loan.” 
(c) No deficiency judgment shall lie in any event on any loan, refinance, or 
other credit transaction (collectively, a “credit transaction”) which is used to 
refinance a purchase money loan, or subsequent refinances of a purchase money 
loan, except to the extent that in a credit transaction, the lender or creditor 
advances new principal (hereafter “new advance”) which is not applied to any 
obligation owed or to be owed under the purchase money loan, or to fees, costs, or 
related expenses of the credit transaction. Any new credit transaction shall be 
deemed to be a purchase money loan except as to the principal amount of any new 
advance. For purposes of this section, any payment of principal shall be deemed to 
be applied first to the principal balance of the purchase money loan, and then to the 
principal balance of any new advance, and interest payments shall be applied to 
any interest due and owing. The provisions of this subdivision shall only apply to 
credit transactions that are executed on or after January 1, 2013. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
127. See NELSON ET AL., supra note 59, at 743; see also Union Bank v. Wendland, 126 Cal. 
Rptr. 549, 554 (Ct. App. 1976) (holding that refinanced mortgages are not the same as purchase 
money mortgages and therefore do not fall within the standard of 580b); Burns, supra note 98, at 
2080 (providing an in-depth analysis of section 580b and the meaning of “purchase money 
mortgage”); Palm v. Schilling, 244 Cal. Rptr. 600, 609 (Ct. App. 1988) (“The explicit language of 
section 580b brooks no interpretation other than that deficiency judgments are prohibited by a 
purchase money mortgagee so long as a purchase money mortgage or deed of trust is in effect on 
the original real property.”). 
128. See Burns, supra note 98, at 2106–07. 
129. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b(b) (Supp. 2014).  
130. See Cal. Bank & Trust v. Lawlor, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 38, 43 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (“‘ [T]he 
protections afforded to debtors under the antideficiency legislation do not directly protect guarantors 
from liability for deficiency judgments . . . . [I]f a guarantor expressly waives the protections of the 
antideficiency laws, a lender may recover the deficiency judgment against the guarantor even 
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promises to answer for the debt or perform the obligation of another when the 
person ultimately liable fails to pay or perform.”131  California courts have 
interpreted the guarantor’s obligation as a separate promise, external to the 
debtor’s transaction and, therefore, outside the scope of coverage of the state’s 
anti-deficiency protections.132  However, without a clear extension of protection 
to guarantors, mortgagees can avoid the prohibition on deficiency judgments 
either by requiring guarantors on all residential mortgage loans as a condition for 
their approval, or by including waiver language in the guaranty.133  If lenders 
require guarantors on residential mortgage loans, it would mean that the risks 
formerly placed on the mortgagor under a permissive deficiency judgment 
regime would then be shifted to the guarantor.  Excluding guarantors from the 
anti-deficiency protective fold makes it too easy for lenders to circumvent one of 
the clear goals of the statutes, which is to inject a measure of equity into the 
mortgage loan transaction.   
B. The State of the Law in Florida 
Recent amendments to Florida’s mortgage foreclosure statute,134 known as 
H.B. 87, exemplify the compromise legislators tend to make regarding balancing 
the interests of lenders and borrowers.  The new law, which became effective on 
July 1, 2013, is titled Florida’s Fair Foreclosure Act (“Foreclosure Act”).135  The 
state’s interest in dealing with the heavy backlog of foreclosures prompted 
changes to Florida’s mortgage foreclosure laws.136  The primary goal of the 
Foreclosure Act is to accelerate the foreclosure process.137  The Foreclosure Act 
helps lenders by imposing certain monetary requirements on borrowers in order 
                                                                                                                                   
though the antideficiency laws would bar the lender from collecting that same deficiency from the 
primary obligor.’” (quoting Cadle Co. II v. Harvey, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 150, 154 (Ct. App. 2000))).  
131. Talbott v. Hustwit, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 703, 705 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 2787 (West 2012)). 
132. See, e.g., id. at 705 (“Since section 580a has to do solely with actions for recovery of 
deficiency judgments on the principal obligation [it] has no application to an action against a 
guarantor.” (quoting Mariners Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Neil, 99 Cal. Rptr. 238, 240 (Ct. App. 1971))); 
see also Seth Weissman, Law of Intended Consequences?, BUS. L. NEWS 2010, at 59, 60, available 
at http://www.jmbm.com/docs/ sethweissmanlawofintendedconsequences.pdf (“A guarantor’s 
obligations are generally regarded as separate and distinct from those of the Borrower. . . .”). 
133. Some measure of protection is given by California courts’ decisions holding that they 
will not recognize so-called “sham-guaranties.” See Cal. Bank & Trust, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 43 
(“‘[T]he protections afforded to debtors under the antideficiency legislation do not directly protect 
guarantors from liability for deficiency judgments.’” (quoting Cadle Co. II, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 
154)). An outright prohibition on deficiency judgments is more reliable, than relying upon the 
judiciary to ferret out these circumventions. 
134. H.B. 87, 2013 Leg., 115th Sess. (Fla. 2013). 
135. 2013 Fla. Laws ch. 2013–137. 
136. See Gary Blankenship, Foreclosures in Florida Dip, FLORIDA BAR NEWS (Oct. 1, 2013), 
http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNNews01.nsf/RSSFeed/82A9ECE4B8E6CCA685257BE
F0043F02C. 
137. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 702.015(1) (West 1994 & Supp. 2014). 
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to defend against foreclosure actions and by instituting procedures that impact 
the borrower’s ability to exercise redemption rights.138  The Foreclosure Act 
does not eliminate the deficiency judgment remedy.139  Instead, it substantially 
reduces the permissible period for obtaining a deficiency judgment from five 
years to one year; the time period for collecting on the deficiency judgment is 
left unchanged.140  The change helps borrowers in that it restricts the window of 
uncertainty regarding whether the lender will secure a personal liability 
judgment following foreclosure. However, the amendment fails to adequately 
address the borrower’s need for finality so that the borrower can plan the 
borrower’s future financial moves more effectively without being concerned that 
there is a likely bankruptcy filing in this individual’s future.  The Foreclosure 
Act only applies to foreclosure actions “commenced on or after July 1, 2013.”141  
Consequently, the new law will not protect the numerous individuals who have 
already experienced foreclosure and have personal liability judgments entered 
against them.  
Mortgagees may bring an action for a deficiency judgment in Florida in 
accordance with Section 702.06 of the state’s foreclosure law.142  The 
Foreclosure Act amends this section to limit the deficiency amount to “the 
difference between the judgment amount, or in the case of a short sale, the 
outstanding debt, and the fair market value of the property on the date of sale” if 
the property is owner-occupied143 and residential.144  The restriction regarding 
the deficiency calculation should not be limited to owner-occupied dwellings.  
Rather, it should extend to all residential mortgage loans, as argued in Sections 
IV through VI.  The Florida House of Representatives Staff Analysis to H.B. 87 
concludes that the additions to Section 702.06 “appear[] to codify the current 
practice of the courts when rendering a deficiency judgment.”145  Under current 
practice, Florida courts look to Section 45.031(8), which—like California’s 
mortgage statute—is a civil procedure statute that provides guidance on 
                                                                                                                                   
138. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §702.036 (West 1994 & Supp. 2014) (relating to the finality of the 
foreclosure).  
139. See H.B. 87, 2013 Leg., 115th Sess. (Fla. 2013). 
140. H.R. 87, 2013 Leg., 115th Sess. (Fla. 2013) (amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11 (West 
2014)). The limitations period begins to run on “the day after the certificate is issued by the clerk of 
court or the day after the mortgagee accepts a deed in lieu of foreclosure.” H.R. 87, 2013 Leg., 
115th Sess. (Fla. 2013). Once a deficiency judgment is obtained in Florida, it is money judgment 
with a 20-year life.  
141. H.B. 87, 2013 Leg., 115th Sess. (Fla. 2013) (amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(5)(h) 
(West 2014)). 
142. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 702.06 (West 1994 & Supp. 2014). 
143. FLA. H.R., supra note 30, at 6–7. 
144. H.R. 87 § 5, 2013 Leg., 115th Sess. (Fla. 2013) (amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 702.06 
(West 1994 & Supp. 2014)).  
145. FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STAFF ANALYSIS, H.B. 87, at 6 (2013) (citing 
Trustees of Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas, Pension Fund v. Indico Corp., 401 So. 2d 904 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1981)), http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName= 
h0087zl.CJS.DOCX&DocumentType=Analysis&BillNumber=0087&Session=2013. 
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determining whether a deficiency will be realized in a judicial foreclosure 
sale.146  Section 45.031(8) of the Florida Civil Procedure Code allows the judge 
to consider a number of factors to determine whether a deficiency exists.147  
Those factors include the “amount bid”—that is, the foreclosure sale price—and 
evidence introduced by the mortgagor based upon, inter alia, property taxes, 
their own assessment of the property’s value, or the assessment of an expert 
appraiser.148  Because the judge has latitude149 and the foreclosure sale price is 
not the absolute determinant of the value of the property that will be used to 
assess whether a deficiency exists, some have characterized Section 45.031(8) as 
a fair value statute.150  Section 45.031(8), however, has actually caused 
considerable confusion amongst courts.151  As Nelson and Whitman note, there 
is conflicting case precedent as to whether looking to the foreclosure sale price is 
the rule that only should be departed from if there is evidence of “fraud or other 
inequitable conduct.” 152  The differing interpretations of the statute raise 
questions as to whether Florida is in fact a true fair value state.153  The 
Foreclosure Act requires that the outstanding balance and the fair market value 
are the measures that should be used, but that still leaves room for the judge to 
determine fair market value.154  
Regardless of how Florida’s law is ultimately characterized, Florida’s 
mortgage laws do not fully address the issues that are raised by the availability of 
the deficiency judgment remedy.  While limiting the period to obtain a 
deficiency judgment benefits borrowers along with the “fair market value” 
measure, Florida’s mortgage laws, nonetheless, fall short of providing borrowers 
                                                                                                                                   
146. Section 45.031(8) provides in relevant part: “If the case is one in which a deficiency 
judgment may be sought and application is made for a deficiency, the amount bid at the sale may be 
considered by the court as one of the factors in determining a deficiency under the usual equitable 
principles.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 45.031(8) (West 2006 & Supp. 2014). 
147. See id. 
148. Nelson and Whitman comment, “[T]here is some evidence that Florida trial courts allow 
mortgagors to introduce evidence of the fair market value of foreclosed real estate and that those 
courts use their determination of value, rather than the foreclosure sale price, to calculate the 
amount of the deficiency judgment.” NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 59, at 718.  
149. Id. (quoting McCollem v. Chinese, 832 So. 2d 194, 196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); 
Hamilton Inv. Trust v. Escambia Developers, Inc., 352 So. 2d 883, 884 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)); 
see also First Union Bank of Fla. v. Goodwin Beach P’ship, 644 So. 2d 1361, 1362 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1994) (holding that the trial court had discretion to consider unpaid delinquent taxes in 
calculating the fair market value of the foreclosed property); FDIC v. Hy Kom Dev. Co., 603 So. 2d 
59, 60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 702.06 (West 1994 & Supp. 2014) 
Savers Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Sandcastle Beach Joint Venture, 498 So. 2d 519, 521 (1986) 
(holding the entry of a deficiency judgment following a foreclosure is within the discretion of the 
trial judge); Carlson v. Becker, 45 So. 2d 116, 116 (1950). 
150. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 59, at 717–18 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 45.031(8) 
(West 2006 & Supp. 2014)). 
151. See id. at 717 (quoting R.K. Cooper Constr. Co. v. Fulton, 216 So.2d 11, 13 (Fla. 1968)). 
152. Id. at 718.  
153. See id.  
154. H.B. 87 § 5, 2013 Leg., 115th Sess. (Fla. 2013). 
2014] REALLOCATING RISK AND DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT LIABILITY 269 
with adequate relief. Sections IV through VI make the case for why deficiency 
judgments should be eliminated altogether. 
C. The State of the Law in Illinois 
The Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law provides that mortgagees may seek a 
deficiency judgment in a judicial sale foreclosure under the following 
circumstances: “[i]f the sale of the mortgaged real estate fails to produce a 
sufficient amount to pay the amount found due, the plaintiff may have a personal 
judgment against any party in the foreclosure indicated as being personally liable 
therefor and the enforcement thereof be had as provided by law.”155 
Mortgagors in Illinois do not have all of the protections that are available to 
borrowers in California and Florida. For example, Illinois has neither a one-
action rule nor a fair value statute.156  Yet, it is clear that anti-deficiency laws are 
needed because mortgagees have resorted to seeking deficiency judgments 
against Illinois borrowers in the past.157  In lieu of a fair value statute, Illinois has 
a provision that pertains to the price paid for the foreclosed property, which can 
affect whether there is a deficiency.158  A party to a foreclosure may seek to have 
the special matter relating to establishing an agreed minimum price for the 
property, also known as an upset price, applied to the judgment.159 Section 
5/1506(g) of the Illinois statute provides: 
 
If all of the parties agree in writing on the minimum price and that the 
real estate may be sold to the first person who offers in writing to 
purchase the real estate for such price, and on such other commercially 
reasonable terms and conditions as the parties may agree, then the court 
                                                                                                                                   
155. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1504(f) (2012). Section 5/15-1508(e) provides that: 
 
In any order confirming a sale pursuant to the judgment of foreclosure, the court 
shall also enter a personal judgment for deficiency against any party (i) if otherwise 
authorized and (ii) to the extent requested in the complaint and proven upon presentation 
of the report of sale in accordance with Section 15-1508. Except as otherwise provided in 
this Article, a judgment may be entered for any balance of money that may be found due 
to the plaintiff, over and above the proceeds of the sale or sales, and enforcement may be 
had for the collection of such balance, the same as when the judgment is solely for the 
payment of money. 
 
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1508(e) (2012); see also 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1511 (2012) 
(“[F]oreclosure of a mortgage does not affect a mortgagee's rights, if any, to obtain a personal 
judgment against any person for a deficiency.”). 
156. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1101 to -1706 (2012).  
157. Debra Stark reports that, [i]n 11 of 39 judicial cases in 1993 with a deficiency (28.2%), 
the lender sought a deficiency judgment (in 4 of the 39 cases this information was not available). In 
4 of the 31 judicial sales cases in 1994 with a deficiency (12.9%), the lender sought a deficiency 
judgment.” Stark, supra note 67, at 671 n.143. 
158. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1506(f)(14), (g) (2012). 
159. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1506(g) (2012).  
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shall order the real estate to be sold on such terms, subject to 
confirmation of the sale in accordance with Section 15–1508.160 
 
This upset price provision serves several purposes.  It can operate as a check 
on the mortgagee who may otherwise be motivated to bid the lowest amount 
possible for the real estate knowing that the mortgagee can file for a personal 
deficiency judgment against the mortgagor to cover the difference between the 
amount bid and the loan balance.  This section also may be viewed as working 
along with the statutory right of redemption, to encourage mortgagees to bid an 
amount that is closer to the fair market value of the real estate.161  It allows the 
mortgagor some input into the outcome of the foreclosure sale and provides a 
measure of control for the mortgagor to protect her equity and to minimize or 
avoid the possibility of a resulting deficiency.  If the final foreclosure sale price 
is high enough, then the outstanding loan balance will be satisfied.  If the price is 
higher than the outstanding balance, plus any fees to which the mortgagee is 
entitled, the mortgagor will be able to claim the excess—that is, capture some of 
her equity.  While it is beneficial to Illinois mortgagors that Section 5/1506(g) 
exists, according to one study of foreclosures for 1993 and 1994 in Illinois, 
mortgagors generally did not file a motion with the court to utilize the special 
matters in their foreclosures.162  The study attributes the failure of distressed 
borrowers to rely upon the equalizing measures to the borrowers’ unawareness 
of the availability of the special matters.163  
Several conclusions can be drawn from this information.  First, the Illinois 
Special Matters minimum price provision does not go far enough in protecting 
mortgagors—it is optional.164  Consequently, there is a risk that borrowers will 
not take advantage of the provision because they do not know about it.  Further, 
it is unlikely, if mortgagees are operating in their own best interests, that they 
will bring the provision to the attention of the borrower, prior to the foreclosure 
proceeding.  Second, the parties may not be able to “agree in writing on the 
minimum price” for the sale of the property.165  Mortgagees have an interest in 
                                                                                                                                   
160. Id. 
161. Typically, the statutory right of redemption functions to discourage the lender from 
bidding low in that it provides a period of time during which the defaulted mortgagor may pay the 
foreclosure sale price plus any fees to reclaim the property. If the lender bids too low, it gives the 
defaulted borrower an opportunity to reclaim the property at the low bid price. See Catherine A. 
Gnatek, Note, The New Mortgage Foreclosure Law: Redemption and Reinstatement, 1989 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 471, 476–77 (1989). Under the Illinois statute, the mortgagor may redeem the property for 
“[t]he amount specified in the judgment of foreclosure, which shall consist of (i) all principal and 
accrued interest secured by the mortgage and due as of the date of judgment” plus all costs allowed 
under the law. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1603(d) (2012). In Illinois, the statutory redemption 
period runs “3 months from the date of entry of a judgment of foreclosure.” 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/15-1603(b) (2012). 
162. See Stark, supra note 19, at 670–71. 
163. See id. at 671. 
164. See id. at 670. 
165. Id. at 654 (quoting 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1506(g) (2012). 
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getting real estate off their books due to ongoing carrying costs.166  The fact that 
cost operates as a strong motivating factor to sell is especially true in 
recessionary times when there are high rates of foreclosure and a lender has a lot 
of inventory.  Trying to deal with the high inventory levels becomes 
unmanageable after a while.  If this is the prevailing state, it is to a lender’s 
advantage to sell the property as quickly as reasonably possible, and obtain a 
deficiency judgment to cover any differences between the outstanding loan 
balance and the foreclosure sale price.  
Mortgagors in Illinois are also in need of anti-deficiency protection because 
there is evidence that Illinois courts are moving away from the local practice of 
denying or discouraging a deficiency judgment request in connection with the 
order confirming the judicial sale.167  It strengthens the mortgagor’s position to 
prohibit deficiency judgments outright, rather than relying upon an optional 
special matters provision or upon the foreclosure judge’s sense of fairness and 
discretion regarding whether a deficiency judgment should be granted.  For these 
reasons, the state legislature of Illinois should adopt an anti-deficiency statute 
prohibiting deficiency judgments in residential mortgage transactions in 
accordance with the proposal offered in Section VI.  
IV. THE CASE IN FAVOR OF ANTI-DEFICIENCY LEGISLATION: WHY ANTI-
DEFICIENCY LAWS ARE NEEDED 
While the present economic situation instigated this review of anti-
deficiency laws and public policy, it is important to clarify that, regardless of the 
economic climate, government should take action to prohibit deficiency 
judgments for residential mortgage loans.168  The prevailing conditions of a 
crisis, like the Great Recession, merely serve to accentuate the dire need for 
widespread reform in this area.  The convergence of economically debilitating 
events169 places mortgagors in a precarious position.  But even absent a crisis, 
residential mortgagors are always at a disadvantage—relative to lenders.170  The 
crisis conditions have resulted in an unprecedented number of foreclosures 
                                                                                                                                   
166. See id. at 666–67. 
167. Remarks of various panelists presented at Judge’s panel at University of Northern Illinois 
College of Law’s Foreclosure Symposium (April 2012); see also 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 15-1508 
(2012) (allowing discretion to judges on whether to grant deficiency judgment); Ghent & Kudlyak, 
supra note 26, at 3179 n.9. (stating that in Illinois: “a judge may opt not to confirm the sale on the 
grounds that ‘justice was not otherwise done.’ In practice, this means that the granting of a 
deficiency judgment is at the discretion of the judge and judges rarely grant deficiency judgments 
on residential property.”) 
168. See Singer, supra note 3, at 549. 
169. See Bernanke, supra note 38 (discussing series of factors contributing to the Great 
Recession). 
170. See Hughes, supra note 3, at 122. 
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across the nation.171  This Article builds upon the existing body of scholarship, 
which offers suggestions on how the foreclosure wave can be stemmed, and on 
how those in danger of being foreclosed upon can best be served by the law,172 
by articulating a way to alleviate the predicament of the mortgagor in the 
aftermath of foreclosure.  
Several arguments weigh in favor of adopting anti-deficiency legislation for 
residential mortgage loan borrowers and strengthening the protections in states, 
like California, where there are notable gaps in the protective measures.  Lenders 
should assume a larger proportion of the accompanying risks of residential 
mortgage loans for several reasons.  Lenders are instrumental in creating loan 
products.173  Lenders are better situated to appreciate and monitor economic 
markets and downturn risks in relation to their loan products.174  The 
sophisticated banking industry, of which lenders are a part, is the central driver 
producing deficiencies and profits.175  Lenders can more easily absorb the losses 
associated with loan defaults and foreclosure.176 
A. Lenders are in a Better Position than Borrowers to Evaluate the Risks of 
the Market 
Lenders are in a better position to appreciate the many risks associated with 
lending and home ownership.177  Lenders are skilled in or work with 
professionals who are trained in the practice of assessing risk.178  In particular, 
they engage in the practice of evaluating the risks associated with the mortgage 
loan transaction.179  Borrowers, as a group, do not fit this description.  
Risk is made up of several factors.  Many borrowers do not fully appreciate 
the risks associated with purchasing a house.180  First, the expectations of the 
                                                                                                                                   
171. See Amy Hoak, Top 10 Cities Where Foreclosure Rates Are Highest, MARKETWATCH 
(Jan. 27, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/top-10-cities-where-foreclosure-
rates-are-highest-2011-01-27; see also Ryan Allen, Who Experiences Foreclosures? The 
Characteristics of Households Experiencing a Foreclosure in Minneapolis, Minnesota, 26 HOUSING 
STUD. 845, 845–46 (2011) (stating that residential properties in the foreclosure process more than 
tripled from 1 percent to 3.3 percent).  
172. See generally Melissa B. Jacoby, The Value(s) of Foreclosure Law Reform, 37 PEPP. L. 
REV. 511 (2010) (providing a helpful summary and review of the traditional foreclosure law 
scholarship).  
173. See Singer, supra note 3, at 502 (stating that the bankers are responsible for issuing loan 
documents). 
174. See id. 
175. See id. at 501. 
176. See id. at 537. 
177. See id. at 501, 507 (citing Alan M. White, Losing the Paper—Mortgage Assignments, 
Note Transfers and Consumer Protection, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 468, 471 (2012)). 
178. See id. at 508 (citing KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME 
VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 50 (2011)). 
179. See id. (citing ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 178, at 48). 
180. See Stark, supra 19, at 134. 
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borrower and the mortgage lender are an intangible part of the mortgage loan.181 
The borrower has expectations that either the value of the house purchased will 
remain constant or rise over the life of the loan.182  Generally, the homebuyer is 
not contemplating the possibility that the U.S. economy will experience a severe 
economic crisis along with a widespread decrease in home values.183  The 
housing market industry fosters this belief.184  That is, brokers, lenders, 
appraisers, and the government promote the idea that “you can’t lose with home 
ownership because the home is a stable, tangible asset that will appreciate in 
value over time,” and the widely held belief that “you would be a fool not to 
purchase a home to take advantage of the ever rising housing values.” 185  There 
was also the view that if one was renting one was throwing away one’s money 
because at the end of one’s rental term one would have no asset to show for it.186  
To the extent that this network of real estate professionals and the government 
are complicit in creating the perception that there is very little at stake in 
homeownership,187 the devastating losses that result when the bubble bursts 
should fall more heavily on the lending industry. Prohibiting deficiency 
judgments in residential mortgage loan transactions will place some of the risk 
associated with such loans on lenders, where it belongs. 
Second, the risk calculation also includes the likelihood of being able to 
refinance or modify the loan.  If a loan will be packaged along with other 
mortgage-backed securities and sold, the borrower’s ability to refinance may be 
severely restricted.188  If the borrower needs to negotiate with the entity that 
                                                                                                                                   
181. See Singer, supra note 3, at 558–59. 
182. See id. at 507–08 (citing ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 178, at 10). 
183. See id. at 502. 
184. See id.; see also Christopher L. Peterson, The Political Economy of Consumer Credit 
Securitization: Comparing Predatory Lending in Home Finance in the US, UK, Germany and 
Japan, in CONSUMER CREDIT, DEBT AND BANKRUPTCY: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES 32, 47 (Johanna Niemi et al. eds., 2009) (illustrating the deceptive tactics and 
“unrealistically underwritten” financial plans lenders used on buyers that helped sustain the housing 
bubble and an “aggregate illusion of appreciation”); Denning, supra note 83 (providing a brief 
background of the 2008 financial crisis). 
185. The hypothetical quotes are analogous to typical statements a lender would make to a 
borrower to promote homeownership. See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Homeownership–Dream or 
Disaster?, 21 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 17, 25–27 (2012) (citations 
omitted) (discussing the promotion of homeownership in U.S. housing policy over decades); see 
also Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 8, at 956–57 (providing a historical outline of the federal 
government encouraging and subsidizing homeownership). See generally Lawrence J. Vale, The 
Ideological Origins of Affordable Homeowership Efforts, CHASING THE AMERICAN DREAM: NEW 
PERSPECTIVES ON AFFORDABLE HOMEOWNERSHIP supra note 54, at 15–40 (providing an 
assessment of the origins of affordable homeownership efforts and goals).  
186. See Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 11, at 970 (citing IRENE HARDILL, GENDER, 
MIGRATION AND THE DUAL CAREER HOUSEHOLD 48 (2002)). 
187. See Salsich, supra note 185, at 25–27 (citations omitted) (pointing out instances of 
federal support for homeownership). 
188. See Amy Feldman, Foreclosure Nation, COLUMBIA L. SCH. MAG., (Summer 2011), 
http://www.law.columbia.edu/magazine/5994/foreclosure-nation (discussing the limitations when 
relying upon mortgage servicers to modify existing loans). 
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holds the note, the borrower will not be able to because the lender will state that 
it is just the servicer, without any authority to renegotiate the loan terms.189  To 
the extent that lenders have the ability to either grant the request to renegotiate 
the loan terms or facilitate the process of mortgagors renegotiating terms with 
third parties, lenders can more effectively guard against the occurrence of loan 
defaults.190  Lenders have participated in perpetuating certain narratives about 
the loan process, such as the ease of refinancing or modifying a loan, and what 
the loan experience will be over the course of a loan.191  For example, if the loan 
with which a borrower starts is not as favorable as the borrower wishes, lenders 
and mortgage brokers cultivate the belief that the “starter loan” is not immutable 
and can be exchanged for a loan with more favorable terms, such as a one with a 
lower fixed interest rate.192  Related to this narrative is the idea that not only will 
it be possible to make an exchange but it will be fairly quick and painless to do 
so—that is, not expensive and not unduly burdensome, in terms of completing 
the paperwork necessary to accomplish the goal.  The mortgagee might go even 
further in attempting to discourage the mortgagor from pursuing any means of 
modifying the loan.193  This inflexibility is part of the risk that many mortgagors 
do not fully appreciate but of which mortgagees are well aware because they are 
                                                                                                                                   
189. See id. 
190. There is no guarantee that lenders would be successful in assisting in the renegotiation of 
the terms of mortgage loans on behalf of mortgagors even if they were willing to do so. However, if 
the mortgage loan has been sold into the secondary market, lenders have a better chance at 
renegotiating the terms than mortgagors who have no access to the investors of their loans.  
191. See Singer, supra note 3, at 502–503; see also Peterson, supra note 184, at 47 (“Brokers 
commonly encouraged debtors to buy debts with teaser pricing, explaining away any concerns with 
the rationale that ‘you can just refinance later.’”); Ruth Simon & James R. Hagerty, Mortgage Mess 
Shines Light on Broker’s Role: Job-Hopping Mr. Shaikh Left Trail of Lawsuits, Failed License 
Exams, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2007, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB118360072311457784 (“As business surged, some brokers put borrowers into loans they didn’t 
understand, couldn’t afford or were otherwise ill-suited for, one reason defaults have 
skyrocketed.”). 
192. While perhaps not all lenders and brokers engaged in this practice leading up to the 2007 
economic crisis, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the practice was widespread throughout 
the lending industry. See Antje Berndt, Burton Hollifield, and Patrik Sandas, The Role of Mortgage 
Brokers in the Subprime Crisis, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16175, 2010) 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16175; see Simon & Hagerty, supra note 191, at A12; 
Alistair Barr, Subprime Crisis Shines Light on Mortgage Brokers, MARKETWATCH  (Apr. 10, 2007, 
11:30 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/subprime-crisis-shines-spotlight-on-mortgage-
broker-practices (noting that many home mortgage brokers failed to disclose important and costly 
details of the new loan.  
193. A number of scholars have analyzed the impediments to the refinance and loan 
modification processes. See Schill, supra note 37, at 520. In some situations the modification either 
does not provide adequate relief—for example, the interest rate on the debt is still too burdensome 
for the mortgagor—or the mortgagor is not granted a loan modification even when it is in the 
interest of the lender because of a failure of the mortgagor to abide by some technicality.  See 
generally Feldman, supra note 188. 
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dictating the terms.194  Mortgagors have no control over whether they will in fact 
have an opportunity to undertake the aforementioned types of foreclosure 
preventative measures.195  Despite any promises made in connection with the 
initial loan transaction and the mortgagor’s reliance upon those statements, the 
mortgagor may find that in times of financial crisis the comforting words offered 
by the lender and broker were just empty promises rather than loan terms.  If a 
borrower facing substantial financial difficulties with no other access to capital is 
unable to refinance or modify his loan it means that the risk of foreclosure is 
elevated.  
A third aspect of risk concerns the mortgage loan products themselves. 
Lenders are instrumental in developing and promoting loan products—such as 
adjustable rate mortgages, subprime mortgages, and negatively amortized 
loans—which lenders and mortgage loan brokers then peddle to potential 
borrowers.196 Borrowers are more likely to default on these loans.197  Lenders 
have a sense of the costs and benefits of the loans, and their potential to perform 
in the mortgagee’s favor because they created them.  The mortgagor, on the other 
hand, is likely to be someone who is new to the loan products, and, therefore, 
may be tempted to rely upon the lender’s or broker’s explanation of the 
unconventional loans.198  
Another aspect of risk in the home loan context is that the lender, at times, is 
betting that the borrower, ultimately, will not be able to pay the loan the lender is 
willing to advance.199  How many mortgagors enter into their loans considering 
                                                                                                                                   
194. See John W. Schoen, Bank of America Former Employees: ‘We Were Told to Lie’, 
NBCNEWS.COM (June 17, 2013, 3:29 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/suit-bank-america-
paid-bonuses-foreclosures-6C10351458 (reporting on allegations that bank employees routinely 
denied qualified borrowers the chance to modify their loans); see also Shaila Dewan, Monitor Finds 
Mortgage Lenders Still Falling Short of Settlment’s Terms, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/20/business/economy/monitor-finds-lenders-failing-terms-of-
settlement.html?pagewanted=all&module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3As%2C%7B%222%22
%3A%22RI%3A12%22%7D&_r=0 (reporting that four of the five major mortgage lenders are still 
failing to communicate with borrowers and therefore creating frustrations the loan modification 
process). 
195. See Schoen, supra note 194 (reporting on allegations that bank employees routinely 
denied qualified borrowers the chance to modify their loans). 
196. See Singer, supra note 3, at 502–03; see also Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory 
Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2214–15 (2007) (citing Michael D. Larson, It’s 
Buyer Beware When You’re Shopping for a Subprime Loan, BANKRATE (Feb. 2, 2001), 
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/mtg/20000420.asp (explaining how subprime mortgage lenders 
have more leeway in dictating the terms of their instruments resulting in “predatory lending”). 
197. See Jacoby, supra note 31, at 2269 (discussing the availability of empirical research 
establishing a connection between the type of mortgage loan and delinquency rates).  
198. These loans are unconventional in that they depart from the standard fixed-rate 30-year 
mortgage.  
199. Debra Stark notes that in the predatory loan context, a lender may advance a loan even if 
in the lender’s estimation the borrower will not be able to repay it but “the lender is counting on the 
borrower’s equity in the property to become whole after the borrower defaults (commonly referred 
to as “equity stripping”).” Stark, supra note 19, at 134. Stark explains this practice of why a lender, 
essentially, would position itself against the borrower as follows: 
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that potential factor?  If mortgagors viewed their transaction from this 
perspective, they might discount more heavily the statements that a lender or 
broker makes to them regarding their loans. 
Given that lenders are in a stronger position to assess the range of risks that 
accompany real estate transactions, particularly in this era of sophisticated real 
estate vehicles and real estate-backed securities markets that interact on a global 
level, the risks should fall more heavily on lenders.  Placing the lion’s share of 
the risk on lenders is in accordance with addressing moral hazard.  Moral hazard 
refers to the“[l]ack of incentive to guard against risk where one is protected from 
its consequences.”200  Scholars and commentators have raised concerns about 
moral hazard in connection with lenders and borrowers.201  Some economists 
propose, as a way to address moral hazard, that risk should be allocated to the 
“low cost risk avoider” who is defined as “the party who is better able to reduce 
the probability or cost of losses.”202  As this piece argues in the following 
sections, lenders satisfy the low cost risk avoider definition in all respects.  
B. Lenders are an Integral Part of the Industry that Produces Deficiencies 
The burdens of the mortgage loan transaction should fall more heavily on 
lenders because lenders are an integral part of the machinery that helps to 
produce deficiencies.203  Lenders control capital.204  Their decisions and actions 
                                                                                                                                   
 
The answer relates to the ‘atomization’ of loans over the past ten years.  Most 
loans today are arranged by mortgage brokers who earn their fees when the 
loans close.  The mortgage brokers are not affected when the borrower defaults 
on some date after the loan has closed, and so they will continue to market 
unaffordable loans as long as they keep making money from such borrowers.  
The lender who initially makes the loan usually sells the loan to a mortgage 
loan pool and will not face the consequences of a likely future default.  Even 
the ultimate assignee of the loan pool is protected, since the loan was given to 
a borrower with sufficient equity in the property so that when the assignee 
forecloses it can recover the principal paid and retain all of the higher interest 
paid prior to the default. 
 
Id. at 138 n.39. 
This analysis assumes that the overextended borrower will make enough payments on the loan 
to have equity in the property. See Peterson, supra note 184, at 47. 
200. OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_ 
english/moral-hazard (last visited Sept. 11, 2014). 
201. See Inside the Meltdown (Frontline television broadcast Feb. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/meltdown/view/. 
202. Scott Masten, Professor, Univ. of Mich. Ross Sch. Of Bus., Agency Costs, Transaction 
Costs, and the Theory of the Firm, Presentation at Twenty-Ninth Economics Institute for Law 
Professors (July 15–16, 2013), at 23 (discussing contract design). 
203. This Article does not claim that lenders are wholly responsible for market fluctuations 
leading to rapid declines in home prices. There may be numerous factors that contribute to 
borrowers defaulting on their mortgages.  
204. See Mixon, supra note 8, at 9. 
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impact the probability that losses will occur in the housing market.205  In order 
for an individual to acquire financing from a lender, the potential borrower must 
satisfy the conditions determined and imposed by the lender.206  As part of the 
underwriting process, the lender is positioned to evaluate the borrower and the 
real estate that will serve as collateral for the loan.207  As part of their 
assessment, lenders routinely require appraisals of the properties for which 
borrowers seek financing.208  The appraisers must typically be selected from a 
lender-approved appraiser list.209  Lenders participate in the network of 
professionals assigned to valuing property, and they have a deeper understanding 
of home pricing and valuation methods.210  
Unless an individual is an appraiser, is in a business related to the valuation 
of real estate, or is a knowledgeable real estate speculator, it is unlikely that the 
individual will be schooled in the “science” of valuing property.  Individuals, 
most likely, will have available to them comparable sales information provided 
by their real estate broker, and, perhaps, the seller’s broker; anecdotal 
information about sale prices of properties in the area; anecdotal information 
about how a property has performed over time as an asset that serves both the 
functionality component of providing a place to live and the economic goal of 
allowing for wealth accumulation if the asset appreciates over time; information 
available from the media about neighborhoods and property values; and their 
own subjective views based upon their observations of the neighborhood and its 
amenities—for example, quality of schools, location, and condition of the 
structures in the area.211  Buyers may draw upon this information, but they will 
also be evaluating it from the emotional standpoint of having identified a 
property that they like and want to buy.  Often the emotional component will 
                                                                                                                                   
205. In 2008, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke remarked: 
 
Because housing and mortgage markets are tightly interlinked with the rest of 
the economy, actions to strengthen financial markets and the broader 
economy are important ways to address housing issues.  By the same token, 
steps that stabilize the housing market will help stabilize the economy as well. 
 
Ben S. Bernanke, supra note 38. 
206. See Hughes, supra note 3, at 128 (explaining that lenders have certain conditions a 
borrower must satisfy in order for the lender to have a secure loan). 
207. See id. (“[A] more obvious incentive for the lender would be to negotiate for and lend at 
the lowest possible loan-to-value ratio.”). 
208. See id. at 128 n.73 (quoting Washburn, supra note 34, at 843). 
209. See id. (quoting Washburn, supra note 34, at 843). 
210. See Mixon, supra note 8, at 52 n.198 (noting that “[t]he lender is the professional and 
knowledgeable party in the transaction who protects itself by requiring the borrower to pay for an 
appraisal that must meet the lender’s requirements. The lender will refuse to lend if the appraisal 
does not justify the loan”). 
211. See Karen M. Gibler & Susan L Nelson, Consumer Behavior Applications to Real Estate 
20 (Apr. 1998) (paper presented at the American Real Estate Society meeting). 
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have substantial sway over the buyer’s decision to purchase.212  Regarding the 
other information, the buyer is likely to rely, to some extent, upon the 
interpretation of the pricing data offered by real estate professionals.213  
Lenders also will have an arsenal of information available to them, which 
overlaps with that of the buyer’s, save perhaps the anecdotal and personal view 
information.  In contrast to buyers, however, lenders will assess this information 
from the professional vantage point of being in the business of making loans to 
finance the acquisition and disposition of real estate.  Lenders engage in the 
professional actions of making determinations, not only about the 
creditworthiness of individuals requesting mortgage loans, but also the value-
worthiness of the property.214  While lenders also can make mistakes regarding 
their evaluations of the payment performance of individuals and the value of 
properties, the losses should nonetheless fall more heavily on them because they 
have the final say regarding whether to advance a loan for the property being 
contemplated for purchase.  This powerful position means they are responsible 
for making sound determinations as to the “worthiness” of the property.215  The 
lender is interested in making money.216  Therefore, the lender’s evaluation of 
the information regarding whether to finance a real estate purchase will not be 
from an emotional viewpoint, but from an objective one.  Presumably, from this 
objective vantage point, the flaws regarding the valuation of the property and 
market conditions will be more apparent than they would be to a potential 
borrower. Also, as noted in the previous section, lenders sometimes make an 
accurate assessment about the real estate and the borrower—that is, that the 
                                                                                                                                   
212. See Karl E. Case & Robert J. Schiller, Is There A Bubble in the Housing Market?, 2:2003 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 299, 314 (2004) (concluding in connection with surveys 
of homebuyers regarding a 1988 housing bubble “that emotion and casual word of mouth played a 
significant role in home purchase decisions”). See generally Gibler & Nelson, supra note 211, at 
314 (providing analysis on consumer behavior in real estate transactions). 
213. See Gibler & Nelson, supra note 211, at 5 (citing James R. Bettman & Mita Sujan, 
Effects of Framing on Evaluation of Comparable and Noncomparable Alternatives by Expert and 
Novice Consumers, 14 J. CONSUMER RES., 141, 142 (1987) (concluding that “[f]irst time buyers are 
more susceptible to external influences determining what criteria they use during decision-
making”). 
214. Who the lender is investing in when making a decision to advance a residential real estate 
loan has been a matter of contention. Scholar James Hughes takes the position that the lender 
invests in the purchaser of the real estate not in the real estate itself and, therefore, if the real estate 
declines in value and the purchaser suffers a financial setback and is unable to continue paying the 
mortgage, the purchaser should shoulder the losses not the lender. See Hughes, supra note 3, at 132 
(citing Provident Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Pekarek, 3 N.E.2d 983, 984 (Ohio Ct. App. 1936)). In 
contrast to Hughes, this Article takes the position that lenders are investing in both the purchaser 
and the property. The lender’s request for an appraisal and the requirement that the lender approve 
the appraisal suggests that the lender is taking steps to verify that the amount advanced for the loan 
is reasonable in light of the value of the property. This suggests that the lender is making a 
calculated investment in the property not just the person applying for the loan.  
215. See id. at 127 (stating that risk shifting statutes are justified to “prevent mortgagees from 
intentionally lending more money than the value of the mortgagor’s property would justify”). 
216. See Singer, supra note 3, at 507, 514–15, 559. 
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borrower will likely default on the loan—but they choose to advance the 
financing anyway.  
Lenders are the drivers in setting the underwriting standards.217  In the 
period leading up to the present financial crisis, many mortgagees were lax in 
adhering to the underwriting standards in place.218  They routinely failed to 
question improbable property valuations.219  Lenders offered loans based upon 
higher valuations, possibly ignoring data that they had available on properties 
and geographic regions.220  Borrowers relied upon those valuations and accepted 
the loans.221  As the market began to collapse, many lenders changed course and 
resorted to following stricter standards in their request for and review of property 
appraisals.222  In following these stringent standards, lenders often denied 
requests to refinance by claiming that property values have fallen.  The lenders’ 
involvement in ratifying the values of the appraisers impacts a whole chain of 
events.  If the property does not appraise for a certain amount, the lender is 
unlikely to permit the borrower to structure a lower monthly payment through 
refinancing.223  The inability to refinance could lead to the borrower’s default, 
which would be followed by the mortgagee foreclosing on the property.  The 
foreclosure then places the borrower in the position of potentially having to deal 
with a deficiency if the foreclosure sale price does not satisfy the outstanding 
balance.  In this chain, it is evident that lenders are instrumental in helping to 
produce deficiencies. Judging from the current Great Recession, lenders played 
                                                                                                                                   
217. See id. at 509. 
218. See id. at 509–10; see also Peterson, supra note 196, at 2214 (citing Larson, supra note 
196) (discussing how there were certain underwriting standards in place and certain mortgagees 
were not following them). 
219. See Singer, supra note 3, at 510–11. 
220. See Mixon, supra note 8, at 52 n.198 (explaining that “[l]enders have knowingly 
participated in (and even encouraged) sale-facilitating inflation of housing prices to include loan 
discounts, brokerage fees, and other costs that reflect cost of financing an do not add to (or even 
reflect) the value of a house in a cash market”). 
221. See Singer, supra note 3, at 537. 
222. In commenting on housing markets and the weak economy, Federal Reserve Chairman 
Ben Bernanke remarked that, as residential mortgage delinquencies become more prevalent in 2006, 
“lenders tightened standards on higher-risk mortgages as secondary markets for those loans ceased 
to function.” Bernanke, supra note 38. 
223. Chairman Ben Bernanke explained how lenders’ actions served to further deepen the 
economic crisis: 
 
When house prices were rising, higher-risk borrowers who were struggling to 
make their payments could refinance into more-affordable mortgages.  But 
refinancing became increasingly difficult as many of these households found 
that they had accumulated little, if any, housing equity.  Moreover, lenders 
tightened standards on higher-risk mortgages as secondary markets for those 
loans ceased to function.   
 
Id. 
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an integral role in creating the problem.224  Consequently, they should not be 
able to reap the benefits of the crisis at the expense of borrowers.  Adopting an 
anti-deficiency law is a positive step towards preventing a crisis that imperils 
homeowners in the way described.   
C. Lenders Can Better Absorb the Losses of a Declining Housing Market  
Lenders are better able to absorb the losses of a declining housing market 
than borrowers.225  If lenders know that deficiency judgments are not a viable 
option to recuperate portions of the outstanding loan balance, they will take 
whatever precautions necessary to account for the loss of the remedy.226  The 
lending industry will devise a means to address the loss.227  Lenders, as a group, 
have access to more capital and broader markets—for example, sector markets 
such as insurance and international markets—than individual borrowers.228  This 
access to other economic sectors provides opportunities to spread the costs for 
losses.229  As a sophisticated group, lenders should be able to figure out the best 
price points to keep mortgage loans affordable so that they will be available to a 
broad range of individual borrowers.230  For these reasons, lenders are the low 
cost risk avoiders. 
V. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF ARGUMENTS AGAINST ANTI-DEFICIENCY 
LAWS 
The positions advanced in this paper challenge the conventional contract law 
model which holds freedom of contract sacred.  The functions of the contract are 
to “shift risk” to the “low-cost risk bearer,” “align . . . incentives,” and “reduce 
various costs of transacting . . . in transactions supported by relationship-specific 
investments.”231  The arguments against deficiency judgments assert that anti-
deficiency laws interfere with these primary contract functions and do not result 
in the most efficient outcomes.232  The main arguments are that: (i) permitting 
remedies that the parties failed to negotiate undermines the contract as an 
efficient and reliable tool for encapsulating parties’ obligations to each other and 
                                                                                                                                   
224. See generally Singer, supra note 3, at 506–10 (citations omitted) (providing background 
on the actions of subprime mortgage lenders which led to the housing crisis). 
225. See Emily Gildar, Comment, Arizona’s Anti-Deficiency Statutes: Ensuring Consumer 
Protection in a Foreclosure Crisis, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1019, 1024 (2010). 
226. See Mixon & Shepard, supra note 9, at 462–63. 
227. Id. 
228. See Gildar, supra note 225, at 1025–26. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. 
231. Scott E. Masten, Contractual Choice, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF L. AND ECON. 25, 26–27 
(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest ed., 2000), available at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/ 
4100book.pdf (citations omitted). 
232. See Hughes, supra note 3, at 117. 
2014] REALLOCATING RISK AND DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT LIABILITY 281 
the projected economic outcomes of their exchange;233 (ii) the borrower’s failure 
to follow through on the borrower’s promises is morally and ethically wrong;234 
(iii) mortgagors should bear any losses associated with their purchases just as 
they reap the benefits of any appreciation in their property values because they 
are charged with assessing the risks of their purchase;235 (iv) there are better 
alternatives available to protect consumers that are less costly and burdensome to 
lenders;236 and (v) enacting anti-deficiency legislation will ultimately hurt 
middle and low income home purchasers because lenders will increase the price 
of mortgage loans to provide some cushion to protect themselves from the 
possibility that borrowers will walk away when their home values fall below the 
balance of their mortgage loans (“underwater borrowers”).237  
As the following discussion demonstrates, anti-deficiency laws serve the 
goals of the contract in that the protection is geared toward better and more 
efficient outcomes for borrowers and lenders.  
A. Contracts and Anti-Deficiency Legislation 
The first argument against anti-deficiency laws is rooted in the view that 
contracts are an effective and stable means for structuring exchanges.238  
Scholars in this camp espouse the view that freedom of contract without 
government interference should be promoted because it permits those who are 
most knowledgeable about their positions and interested in the outcomes of their 
interactions to negotiate the terms of their agreement.239  Legal scholar Richard 
Posner, writing from a law and economics perspective, asserts that “[t]he most 
important function of contract law is to provide a legal remedy for breach in 
order to enhance the utility of contracting as a method of organizing economic 
activity.”240  Governmental interventions, such as anti-deficiency laws, rarely if 
ever, should be permitted because allowing remedies for which the contractual 
parties did not negotiate for weakens the contract instrument as a vehicle to 
structure the contours of an exchange.241  Anti-deficiency legislation is viewed as 
                                                                                                                                   
233. See Talley, supra 31, at 1196. 
234. Hughes, supra note 3, at 117.  
235. Id. at 129  
236. See id. (arguing that bankruptcy is an appropriate alternative to anti-deficiency 
legislation).  
237. Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and Economics of Subprime Lending, 
80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 29 (2009) (discussing the strength of the incentive to walk away in states 
with anti-defencieny legislation). 
238. Richard Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX L. REV. 
1581, 1582 (2005) (“The main purpose of contracts is to enable performance to unfold over time 
without either party being at the mercy of the other as would be the case if, for example, a buyer 
could refuse to pay for a custom-built house for which there were no alternative buyers at or above 
the agreed price.”). 
239. See Hughes, supra note 3, at 146–47. 
240. See Posner, supra note 238, at 1582.  
241. See Hughes, supra note 3, at 120. 
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counter to the public policy goal of deterring individuals from breaching their 
contractual obligations because it signals to borrowers that there are no serious 
consequences to their actions.242  In order to ensure that contracts have integrity 
and discourage mortgagors from engaging in this conduct, lenders argue that 
contractual terms must be strictly enforced and the remedies available to lenders 
to motivate compliance should not be curtailed.243  Adopting this approach 
fosters society’s willingness to rely on the contract by providing assurance that 
the terms that have been so carefully negotiated will be adhered to by the 
parties.244 This Article challenges the foregoing position.  As argued in the 
following sections, when the government offers consumers financial protection 
in the form of anti-deficiency laws, rather than undermining contracts, it helps to 
address the inherent inequities of mortgage loan transactions and permits 
borrowers to make rational choices regarding their loans in good times and in 
times of severe economic downturn.   
B. Strategic Defaults and Anti-Deficiency Laws 
A troubling prospect to staunch freedom of contract advocates is that anti-
deficiency statutes are likely to encourage strategic defaulters.245  Strategic 
defaulters are individuals who walk away from their payment obligations in 
times of economic crisis and substantially declining home values. 246  Lenders 
maintain that they need deficiency judgments as a disincentive to strategic 
defaults.247  
1. There are already Deterrents in Place to Discourage Strategic 
Defaults  
As an initial matter, it is necessary to explain the term “strategic defaulter” 
in more detail.  A strategic defaulter is a borrower who has the financial 
resources to continue making his monthly mortgage loan payments but chooses, 
once the market value of the mortgaged property falls below the mortgage loan 
amount, to stop making payments, thereby defaulting on his loan.248  Strategic 
                                                                                                                                   
242. See id. 
243. See id. at 147. 
244. Jacoby, supra note 31, at 2267 (commenting on the current mortgage lending structure 
and the expectations that there is “a reliable system of contract enforcement against borrowers who 
default.”). 
245. Zywicki & Adamson, supra note 237, at 29. 
246. See Dov Solomon & Oelia Minnes, Non-Recourse, No Down Payment and the Mortgage 
Meltdown: Lessons from Undercapitlization, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 529, 531 (2011). 
247. Salsich, supra note 185, at 30 (discussing lenders’ choice to pursue foreclosure with all of 
its attendant rights, rather than opting to agree to the cheaper alternatives of deeds in lieu of 
foreclosure or short sales, in order to discourage strategic defaults). 
248. Mortgagors in this position are alternatively referred to as “underwater borrowers” or 
borrowers who have negative equity in their homes. Legal scholar Grant Nelson notes that banks 
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defaulters sometimes engender less empathy because “technically” they can 
afford to pay but decide not to.249  Lenders highlight this group as the reason 
why deficiency judgments and rigorous contractual enforcement are 
necessary.250  The detractors fail to appreciate that there are rational reasons to 
support a borrower’s choice to stop paying on his mortgage loan.251  Some of the 
reasons include the borrower’s desire to rededicate capital toward saving for the 
borrower’s children’s education, or for retirement, or for elder care. The 
borrower may wish to invest in better performing wealth accumulation 
instruments. The borrower’s frustration regarding the inability to refinance his 
loan to receive a lower rate and the borrower’s calculation regarding the house’s 
current value in comparison with the loan amount and the likely time period 
needed for the property to climb back to its value at the time of the borrower’s 
purchase are also likely to factor into a decision to default.252  The borrower 
makes this strategic decision, surrendering the asset of the house, in the hope that 
this will serve to bring finality to the settling of his debt with the mortgagee.253  
This is a rational choice, given the circumstances. 
Disregarding the reasons a mortgagor may choose to default on his 
mortgage, opponents of anti-deficiency laws emphasize that the strategic 
defaulter willingly entered into an arms-length contract with a lender, agreed to 
the terms established, and has the financial wherewithal to continue fulfilling the 
contract but simply opts not to do so.254  From their view, if society fails to 
penalize this person it is equivalent to saying that one’s contractual promises 
don’t matter.255  This Article disagrees for equity and efficiency reasons.  
Property law has, at times, departed from strict adherence to the terms of a real 
estate transaction, relying instead upon equity to address the inherent unfairness 
                                                                                                                                   
have precisely defined the term “strategic defaulters” as borrowers who abruptly change from being 
current on their mortgage to 180-days late “‘while staying current on all their non-real estate debt 
obligations, 6 months after they first went 60 [days late] on their mortgage.’” Nelson & Serbulea, 
supra note 11, at 66 n.6. (quoting Brent T. White, Take This House and Shove It: The Emotional 
Drivers of Strategic Default, 63 SMU. L. REV. 1279, 1284 (2010). The definition of strategic 
defaulter matters. Just because a borrower manages to continue paying on his other debts after 
defaulting on his mortgage loan does not mean that he has the financial resources to make ongoing 
loan payments. A plausible reading of a borrower who behaves in this manner is that he is trying to 
honor his debt obligations to the best of his ability with the financial resources he has available to 
him.  
249. See id. at 67 (citing James R. Hagerty & Nick Timiraos, Debtor’s Dilemma: Pay the 
Mortgage or Walk Away, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2009, at A22). 
250. See Sichelman, supra note 12. 
251. See id. 
252. See White, supra note 248, at 1291–95. 
253. See id. at 1308–09. 
254. See Hughes, supra note 3, at 120. 
255. See id. at 123 (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2002), 
available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mulligan) (arguing that consumer 
protections (e.g. statutory redemption or antideficiency measures) that are external to the contract 
entered into by parties are “‘mulligans’ which permit mortgagors to avoid some of the negative 
consequences of bad luck, their own faulty decision making, or irresponsibility”).   
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of a situation.256  There are already penalties that the property owner suffers in 
defaulting on the mortgage loan.  Relinquishing one’s house comes at significant 
cost to the mortgagor.257  The costs include the loss of the asset, the loss of the 
possibility of recovering any equity the mortgagor has in the property, potential 
federal tax liability, the emotional aspects of losing one’s property, the costs of 
relocation for those who were occupying the relinquished asset, and the costs to 
one’s credit score.258  These costs already operate as deterrents to walking away 
from an underwater property.259  Imposing additional costs on borrowers eclipses 
their ability to be active consumers.260  Ultimately, this outcome negatively 
impacts lenders who would benefit from stable economies and financially 
engaged consumers, who are willing and able to purchase homes.261  In the face 
of the disincentives, if a mortgagor decides that it makes more sense to turn the 
asset over to the mortgagee than to continue paying on a property that is unlikely 
to ever return to the price level the mortgagor purchased it at, then should not 
society support this type of rational decision?  American society permits 
businesses to engage in the rational behavior of the efficient breach of contracts 
in the business context.262  Applying this logic to residential mortgage loans, it 
makes sense to have a law that permits mortgagors to engage in rational conduct 
that leads to more efficient results.   
2. Targeting Strategic Defaulters in Setting Policy Results in a 
Misallocation of Risk 
The empirical evidence available does not establish that anti-deficiency laws 
lead to a higher rate of defaults.263  According to the evidence, no particular 
category of borrowers—that is, non-recourse or recourse—are more likely to 
default when their home values fall below the amount owed on their mortgage 
                                                                                                                                   
256. See Bean v. Walker, 464 N.Y.S.2d 895, 897–98 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (citing N.Y. 
REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1301–91) (following the equity maxim, “equity deems done that which 
ought to be done” and holding that despite the language of the contract that provides for remedies 
allowing the seller on a land installment contract to terminate the contract, keep the payments made 
by vendee to date, and reclaim possession of the property, equity requires that the seller institute 
foreclosure proceedings in order to extinguish the buyer’s equitable interest). 
257. See Mixon & Shepard, supra note 9, at 464–65. 
258. See id. 
259. See Brent T. White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear, and the Social 
Management of the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971, 972 (2010). 
260. See id. at 1022. 
261. See id. at 1020–21. 
262. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “efficient breach” as a strategy that “allow[s] [a party] to 
breach a contract and pay damages, if doing so would be more economically efficient than 
performing under the contract.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 592 (9th ed. 2009). See Robert 
Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 273, 284–86 (1970) (quoting Addison Mueller, Contract Remedies: Business Fact and Legal 
Fantasy, 1967 WIS. L. REV. 833, 835. See also Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 
1284, 1289 (7th Cir. 1985) (discussing efficient breaches).  
263. Ghent & Kudlyak, supra note 26, at 3140. 
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loans.264 Scholars Andra Ghent and Marianna Kudlyak acknowledge that 
“[u]nconditionally, there is no difference between the default rates in recourse 
and non-recourse states” and that “[r]ecourse does not have a statistically 
significant effect on the default rate.”265  Another study draws a similar 
conclusion that the threat of a deficiency judgment does not result in a decrease 
in the number of defaults and foreclosures.266  In deciding on the appropriate 
policy, one cannot draw sound conclusions merely by comparing foreclosure 
rates in California (non-recourse) and Illinois (recourse).  There is a high 
foreclosure rate in California,267 which has anti-deficiency laws, but there are 
also high foreclosure rates in other states, such as Illinois,268 which do not have 
anti-deficiency statutes.  Based upon that data alone, it does not follow that a 
greater percentage of the foreclosures in California are attributable to so-called 
strategic defaults, rather than to circumstances under which people could not 
afford to continue making their mortgage payments and, as a result, ended up 
defaulting. 
Deficiency judgments and strategic defaulters are presently the focus of 
significant research activity.269  The heightened attention can be explained, in 
part, by lenders and their lobbyists seeking concrete evidence to establish that 
changing mortgage laws in a way that benefits borrowers will invite massive 
defaults in times of economic crisis because there is no penalty in place to 
                                                                                                                                   
264. Luisi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, & Luigi Zingales, Moral and Social Constraints to Strategic 
Default on Mortgages, 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15145, 2009) 
(“assuming that a homeowner [in a non-recourse state] will default as soon as his home equity 
becomes negative is clearly wrong.”).  Ghent & Kudlyak, supra note 26, at 3140. 
265. Ghent & Kudlyak, supra note 26, at 3140. Ghent and Kudlyak note that “states that allow 
recourse for lenders do not have fewer defaults.” Id. at 3149. 
266. See Feldman, supra note 188, at 41. 
267. For example, Riverside-San Bernadino, California was “fifth highest among the nation’s 
20 largest metro[]” areas with the highest foreclosure rates in October 2013, with “one in every 531 
housing units with a foreclosure filing.” U.S. Foreclosure Activity Increases 2 Percent in October 
Driven By Continued Rise in Judicial Auctions, REALTYTRAC (Nov. 12, 2013), 
http://www.realtytrac.com/content/foreclosure-market-report/october-2013-us-foreclosure-market-
report-7934. 
268. According to RealtyTrac, Illinois numbered among the five states with the highest 
foreclosure rates in October 2013 with “one in every 552 housing units” in some state of 
foreclosure. Chicago “rank[ed] third highest among the 20 largest metro areas nationwide” in that 
same month with one “in every 427 Chicago-area housing units” experiencing “a foreclosure filing 
[in October].” Id. Florida had the highest foreclosure rate in the nation in October 2013 with “one in 
every 332 housing units” having foreclosure filings totaling approximately “26,962 Florida 
properties.” Id. 
269. See Michael Wilkerson, Mortgage Default in Southern California: Examining Distressed 
Borrower’s Decision Making and Market Contagion, (Ph.D dissertation, Claremont College), 
(2012) available at http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgu_etd/35; Christopher J. Mayer, Edward 
Morrison, Tomasz Piskorski, & Arpit Gupta, Mortgage Modification and Strategic Behavior: 
Evidence from a Legal Settlement with Countrywide 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper 
No. 17065, 2011); Ghent & Kudlyak, supra note 26, at 3139. Guiso et al., supra note 264, at 2.  See 
also David Streitfeld, With No Help in Sight, More Homeowners Walk Away, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 
2010, at A1. 
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dissuade such behavior.270  Identifying who is a strategic defaulter is not an easy 
task.271  Nonetheless, there have been recent innovations in this area relying 
upon different strategies for designing an accurate model to extract data272 or 
drafting a survey to capture the behavior of mortgagors.  Researchers Ghent and 
Kudlyak conducted a study that is garnering attention.273  They recognize that for 
all borrowers there is some point at which they will default on their loans if the 
value of their homes as compared to the outstanding loan balance drops to a 
certain level. 274  They then group borrowers according to the range of their home 
appraisal amounts—for example, $300,000–$500,000 or $500,000–$750,000.275  
Ghent and Kudlyak use “the appraisal amount . . . as a proxy for both the 
lender’s amount of recourse and the borrower’s financial means in general.”276  
Based upon their study, they conclude that “recourse decreases borrowers’ 
sensitivity to negative equity, i.e., recourse deters some borrowers with negative 
equity from defaulting.”277  They further conclude that:  
                                                                                                                                   
270. See Colin Robins, Expansion of California’s Anti-Deficiency Laws Means More 
Litigation for Creditors, DSNEWS (Feb. 19, 2014, 10:01 AM), http://dsnews.com/news/02-19-
2014/expansion-of-californias-anti-deficiency-laws-means-more-litigation-for-creditors/. 
271. Determining whether a person is a strategic defaulter is not an easy assessment to make. 
As economists, Luisi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, Luigi Zingales, note: 
 
It is difficult to study the strategic default decision, because it is de facto an 
unobservable event. While we do observe defaults, we cannot observe whether 
a default is strategic. Strategic defaulters have all the incentives to disguise 
themselves as people who cannot afford to pay and so they will appear as non-
strategic defaulters in all the data. 
 
Guiso et al., supra note 264, at 4.  
272. Without undertaking an extensive empirical study exploring what led each defaulted 
mortgagor to walk away from his property, it is difficult to say whether prohibiting deficiency 
judgments gives rise to more strategic defaults. To initiate such a study, it would be necessary to 
identify a pool of mortgagors who have defaulted on their mortgage loans. The researcher would 
need to examine each person’s finances or rely upon survey responses to make the determination 
that the person could have paid but chose not to because there was no penalty attached to walking 
away beyond losing the house and the sunk costs that the individual put into the house via his down 
payment, past mortgage loan payments, and improvements. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 
constructed a survey based on hypothetical questions to ascertain what motivates a homeowner to 
default on his mortgage loan even though he has the financial ability to continue meeting his debt 
obligation. See id. As they observe, their study is not based upon what people have actually done, 
but upon what they say that they would do in certain situations. See id at 6. Their empirical study 
does not address the question of whether the absence of the deficiency judgment remedy leads to 
more strategic defaults as compared to states in which deficiency judgments are permitted.  
273. See generally Ghent & Kudlyak, supra note 26. 
274. See id. at 3154. 
275. See id. 
276. Id. at 3177. 
277. Id. at 3140. Specifically, the authors present “estimates of the probabilities of default in 
recourse and non-recourse states:” 
 
At the mean value of the default option at the time of default and for homes appraised at 
$300,000 to $500,000, borrowers in non-recourse states are 81% more likely to default 
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[the] results indicate that some borrowers choose not to default when 
the lender has recourse, which indicates that they are capable of 
continuing to make payments . . . . Our results regarding the differential 
effect of recourse by the mortgaged property’s appraisal amount indicate 
that at least some defaults on high and moderately priced homes are 
strategic.278  
Prompted by the substantial economic costs the federal government is 
shouldering as a result of the mortgage crisis, and the results of the Ghent and 
Kudlyak study, scholars Grant Nelson and Gabriel Serbulea conclude that, “we 
need a uniform recourse law.”279  Specifically, Nelson and Serbulea advocate 
Congress’ adoption of legislation modeled on the Restatement (Third) of 
Property on Mortgages.280  This approach, which is addressed in Section VI, 
would make recourse the default for all states.281  This Article takes a position 
counter to that conclusion.  Non-recourse should be the default for residential 
mortgage loans.  While it is important to be attentive to the costs that various 
policies may impose on the government, this paper argues that the costs 
associated with retaining the deficiency judgment remedy outweigh the costs of 
eliminating it.  Further, the Ghent and Kudlyak study raises several issues that 
could impact the conclusions and meaning of the data.  The assumption that 
houses falling within a particular price range signals that the homeowner’s 
income must be at a certain level should be questioned, especially given the lax 
underwriting practices of some lenders that permitted borrowers, who clearly did 
not have the income, to qualify for substantial loans to purchase high-priced 
houses.282  Rather than assuming that defaulting borrowers can pay because they 
continue to meet their other debt obligations,283 or because in a recourse state 
they will not default within a certain time frame but borrowers in non-recourse 
states within the same time frame will,284 a more thorough study would include 
                                                                                                                                   
than borrowers in recourse states. For homes appraised at $500,000 to $750,000, 
borrowers in non-recourse states are more than twice as likely to default as borrowers in 
recourse states. For homes appraised at $750,000 to $1,000,000, borrowers in non-
recourse states are 60% more likely to default than borrowers in recourse states. 
 
Id. at 3162.  
278. Id., at 3177.  
279. Nelson & Serbulea, supra note 11, at 91. 
280. Id. at 92. Nelson and Serbulea reason that “[b]ecause the federal government is engaged 
in a massive underwriting of lender losses and acquiring ownership of millions of mortgages and 
mortgage-backed securities, it is ultimately the federal government that will bear the financial 
consequences from foreclosure delay.” Id. at 98 (quoting Nelson, supra note 18, at 608–09). 
281. Id. at 91–92.  
282. The Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash Course, supra note 83; Denning, supra note 
184. 
283. See Nelson & Serbulea, supra note 11, at 66 (discussing a definition of “strategic 
defaulter” adhered to by some lenders). 
284. Ghent & Kudlyak, supra note 26, at 3143–44.  
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examining how much money defaulting borrowers have left after meeting their 
other obligations and what purchases—for example, medical—they are 
foregoing to make the mortgage payment.  
The focus on strategic defaulters to justify retaining the deficiency judgment 
remedy is misplaced.  This Article’s proposal intentionally does not include a 
carveout for wealthy individuals who default on their mortgages.  The rationale 
is that if such a carveout were included, lenders will find a way to exploit it.  
Banks could choose to look to the home appraisal amount as a measure of the 
borrowers’ net worth, adopting the approach of the Ghent and Kudlyak study.285  
Banks could also make the determination of who falls within the carveout based 
upon whether the borrowers “qualify” for a certain loan amount.  In this 
instance, lenders would control the outcome because they have the final say as to 
who qualifies for a loan and for how much they qualify.286  Under either one of 
the scenarios, individuals who do not necessarily have the means to pay and who 
are not necessarily high net worth individuals will be captured within the 
carveout and lenders will be able to pursue them.  Further, even wealthy 
individuals could experience financial setbacks that make paying their mortgage 
loans impossible.287  As it stands now in recourse states, it is left to the discretion 
of the lender whether to obtain a personal liability judgment against a defaulting 
borrower.288  Some argue that economics will prompt lenders to seek the remedy 
only where there is a high probability of recovery.289  If, however, the past 
behavior of lenders is any indication of whether they will act in ways that result 
in the most economically beneficial outcomes across the board, the answer is 
clearly “no.”290  Similarly, secondary market investors in deficiency judgments 
are unlikely to be careful in exercising discretion.291  Government needs to 
impose measures of restraint.292 
Borrowers in recourse states do not receive lower rates on their mortgage 
loans than borrowers in nonrecourse states.293  One could view the circumstance 
of recourse borrowers entering into loans that “cost” the same as loans in non-
recourse states as recourse borrowers hedging against the possibility that they 
                                                                                                                                   
285. Id. at 3159. 
286. See Tracie R. Porter, The Field Between Lions and Zebras . . . Evening the Playing Field 
Between Lenders and Borrowers: Conflicts of Interest and Legal Obligations in the Residential 
Mortgage Transaction, 30 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 623, 676–77 (2012). 
287. See Ghent & Kudlyak, supra note 26, at 3159. 
288. See id. at 3140. 
289. See Nelson & Serbulea, supra note 11, at 90 n.142 (citing Ghent & Kudlyak, supra note 
26, at 3140. 
290. See STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM: THE SUPRIME CRISIS AND THE CASE 
FOR AN ECONOMIC RULE OF LAW 39–40 (2013) (critiquing law and economics views and the 
failure to regulate). 
291. See Nelson, supra note 211, at 585–86. 
292. See Nelson & Serbulea, supra note 11, at 97–98 (quoting Nelson, supra note 18, at 608–
09). 
293. Ghent & Kudlyak, supra note 26, at 3174 (“In no appraisal category do we see evidence 
that borrowers in recourse states enjoy lower interest rates.”). 
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may default in the most cost effective manner—that is, by paying more for the 
loan upfront. This perspective is in accord with Lee Anne Fennell’s approach of 
putting some control back into the hands of the homeowner by allowing the 
owner to “compensate an investor to take on off-site downside risk . . . who can 
hold it as part of a diversified portfolio.” 294  The deficiency judgment remedy is 
inequitable and inefficient because it does not take into account that when 
borrowers in recourse states pay the same amount for their loans as borrowers in 
non-recourse states, lenders have already been compensated for the risk of a 
deficiency.295 
The fact that every mortgagor, non-recourse and recourse alike, does not 
default at the moment when the borrower’s house appraisal value falls below the 
amount of the purchase price or below the amount owed on the mortgage loan 
provides additional support to the argument that deficiency judgments can be 
eliminated without creating a moral hazard for borrowers.296  That is, the 
removal of this remedy will not incentivize all mortgagors to default.297  
Empirical research does not support the conclusion that the punitive incentive of 
the deficiency judgment is necessary to discourage the majority of borrowers 
from defaulting in times of economic distress.298  
Lenders seek deficiency judgments against both strategic defaulters and 
judgment-proof borrowers.299  Given this indiscriminate policy, regardless of 
whether anti-deficiency laws operate to encourage strategic defaulters in times of 
housing market declines, this Article maintains that relying upon the 
bludgeoning instrument of the deficiency judgment as a deterrent to potential 
strategic defaulters places an undue burden on all mortgagors.  
C. Moral Arguments Against Anti-Deficiency Legislation  
Those who make moral arguments against anti-deficiency statutes maintain 
that they foster a norm of unaccountability and irresponsibleness.300  This 
                                                                                                                                   
294. LEE ANN E. FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND PROPERTY 
LINES 197–98 (2009) (defining “off-site downside risk” as “occurrences, events, and conditions 
beyond the four corners of the parcel, such as housing market fluctuations”). 
295. Id. at 198. 
296. See White, supra note 259, at 972.  
297. See id. Moral hazard is a term used by economists to refer to “the reduction in incentives 
to reduce or avoid risk when individuals do not bear the risk.” Masten supra note 202, at 23.  
298. Guiso et. al., supra note 264, at 3 (“Assuming that a homeowner will default as soon as 
his home equity becomes negative is clearly wrong.”).  
299. Silver-Greenburg, supra note 21, at A12; Hundley, supra note 78. 
300. See Hughes, supra note 3, at 120.  Hughes argues that anti-deficiency laws operate to the 
“moral detriment of individual mortgagors” in that they “relieve[] [mortgagors] of an obligation to 
conduct their business affairs in what might be characterized as the ‘right way.’” Id.  These 
arguments may be rooted in the logic of the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution, 
Article I, Section 10.  The Contract Clause provides: “No state shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing 
the Obligation of Contracts.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Chief Marshall expounded upon this 
logic in the case of Ogden v. Saunders, which upheld a state’s bankruptcy law applying to contracts 
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position adopts a narrow focus regarding what is entailed in the residential 
mortgage loan transaction, which involves individual borrowers and an industry 
of lenders.301  There is an inequity in bargaining power as the potential 
homebuyer begins the process of attempting to secure a mortgage loan.302  In 
entering this market, the potential borrower is at a distinct disadvantage because 
the individual cannot actually negotiate the terms of a mortgage loan contract.303 
Lenders utilize the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac forms. Where those uniform terms 
are more beneficial to the mortgage lending industry, individuals who wish to 
purchase a house can do little to avoid accepting them if they need financing.304  
Being able to shop for rates does not do much to address the fundamental 
imbalances in power that exist.305   
The moral argument frames the mortgage loan contract as an equitable 
contract that must be adhered to because it is the product of even-handed 
negotiations between the home purchaser and the lender.306  From this vantage 
point, both parties entered into the loan with a mutual appreciation and deep 
understanding of the complexities of the mortgage loan documents and the 
protections, or lack thereof, provided by them.307  This view is not an adequate 
representation of the mortgage loan transaction.  The power differential between 
                                                                                                                                   
entered after the adoption of the legislation as not being in violation of the United States 
Constitution’s Contract Clause. Marshall noted that: 
 
The power of changing the relative situation of debtor and creditor, of 
interfering with contracts, a power which comes home to every man, touches 
the interest of all, and controls the conduct of every individual in those things 
which he supposes to be proper for his own exclusive management, had been 
used to such an excess by the state legislatures, as to break in upon the 
ordinary intercourse of society, and destroy all confidence between man and 
man. This mischief had become so great, so alarming, as not only to impair 
commercial intercourse, and threaten the existence of credit, but to sap the 
morals of the people, and destroy the sanctity of private faith. To guard the 
continuance of the evil, was an object of deep interest with all the truly wise, 
as well as the virtuous, of this great community, and was one of the important 
benefits expected from a reform of the government. 
 
Saunders, 25 U.S. at 354–55. The arguments relied upon to affirm the importance of carefully 
scrutinizing state laws that modify private law contracts have relevance for debtors. Because of the 
tactics of lenders over the course of the Great Recession and in the immediate years prior, debtors 
are incited to question the fairness of the entire residential mortgage loan transaction. It is also 
important to note that unlike the circumstances that factored into the drafting of the Contract 
Clause—that is, that powerful individuals would use their status to nullify their financial contractual 
obligations—this Article advances arguments in favor of the relatively disempowered individuals 
who enter into residential mortgage loan contracts.  
301. Hughes, supra note 3, at 120. 
302. Mixon, supra note 8, at 88. 
303. Id. 
304. Id. 
305. Mixon, supra note 8, at 87 n.292.  
306. See Hughes, supra note 33, at 122. 
307. See id. 
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lenders and borrowers means that the best terms will not emerge in the 
“negotiation” between borrowers and lenders.308  There is no meaningful 
possibility of negotiating the terms of the mortgage loan contract.309  Instead, the 
contracts function more as form documents.310  Richard Posner argues that if 
consumers are not paying attention to the terms that seem to be inflexible or 
unimportant, they will not shop for contracts that have the best provisions, thus 
the efficient terms will not appear through exchange.311  In treating the loan 
documents as forms, mortgagors will not shop for loan contracts that do not have 
the deficiency judgment remedy.312  Even if they tried to shop for this type of 
contract in a recourse state, it is unlikely they would be able to exert enough 
pressure on lenders to turn their recourse loans into non-recourse ones.313  For 
this reason, the idealized representation should not serve as the basis for a state’s 
refusal to adopt anti-deficiency measures.  Borrowers already recognize the 
importance of abiding by the mortgage loan contract, especially with respect to 
the central obligation of making monthly mortgage payments.314  There is 
evidence to support that even borrowers who encounter financial difficulties go 
to extraordinary lengths to meet their obligations.315  Borrowers have depleted 
their retirement accounts or other financial reserves and have attempted to 
renegotiate the terms of their loans so that they can continue making payments at 
a more manageable level.316  If borrowers are unsuccessful in their efforts to 
preserve their homes, they should not suffer the additional punishment of having 
a personal liability judgment entered against them.  The loss of the real property 
is punitive enough.  Penalizing individuals by subjecting them to personal 
liability does not result in individuals of stronger moral fiber.  Instead, it 
underscores the inflexibility and bias of the mortgage lending system.  
                                                                                                                                   
308. Mixon, supra note 8, at 88. 
309. Id. 
310. See id. at 22 (discussing mortgage documents as form documents).  
311. Posner, supra note 238, at 1585.  
312. Id. 
313. See id. at 1586. 
314. Salsich, supra note 185, at 29. 
315. Id. at 29 (citing Heather Hill Cenoch, Survey: 60% of Americans Frown on Mortgage 
Abandonment, DSNEWS.COM (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.dsnews.com/articles/survey-60-of-
americans-frownonmortgage-abandonment-2011-04-06) (indicating that a majority of the 
individuals polled believe that it is morally unacceptable to default on a mortgage if the individual 
has the financial means to continue paying); see also White, supra note 259, at 4–5 (citing Guiso, et 
al., supra note 264, at 1) (asserting that other factors beyond negative equity drive homeowners to 
default).  
316. See Salsich, supra note 185, at 29; see also White, supra note 259, at 4–5 (citing Guiso, 
et al., supra note 264, at 1) (stating that only one-fourth of defaults are strategic).  
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D. Borrowers Should Bear Losses because they are Responsible for 
Assessing the Risks Associated with their Home Purchases  
Another argument against anti-deficiency legislation asserts that losses 
related to home values are properly placed upon mortgagors because they are 
responsible for making determinations regarding the riskiness of their home 
purchases.317  If their assessment of the risk is incorrect, it is not the fault of the 
lender, so the lender should not be penalized.318  Further, because borrowers reap 
the benefits of homeownership—appreciation in home value, mortgage interest 
deductions, etc.—they should also be required to shoulder the burdens associated 
with it.319  
This argument ignores that both lenders and borrowers are engaged in the 
process of assessing the risks associated with the purchase of real estate.320 
Proponents of this view discount the realities of the valuation process for the 
home purchase.321  The lender requires an appraisal of the house that the 
borrowers intend to purchase.322  The appraiser is usually selected from an 
approved list provided by lenders.323  Borrowers are not typically schooled in the 
mechanics of appraising property; thus, they are susceptible to relying upon the 
appraiser’s valuations regardless of whether they are sound.324  Under this 
process, borrowers can fall victim to properties that have inflated valuations 
because of either improper appraisal methods or appraisals that have not been 
thoroughly vetted by the lender.325  Lenders are in a stronger position to detect 
overvaluations, because they are more skilled in processing valuation 
information.326  As part of the underwriting process, lenders could make the 
determination that, regardless of the appraisal, there appears to be a discrepancy 
between the value of the home and the appraisal value.327  During times of 
accelerated increases in home prices over a three to six month period, a lender’s 
further inquiry is warranted.328  For example, prior to the recession, in the 
nascent period of the housing boom, potential buyers of new construction 
housing were enticed by pricing alternatives of preconstruction pricing, phase I 
                                                                                                                                   
317. Hughes, supra note 3, at 129. 
318. Id.  
319. See id.  
320. Mixon, supra note 8, at 88. 
321. Id. 
322. Id. 
323. J. Kevin Murray, Note, Issues in Appraisal Regulation: The Cracks in the Foundation of 
the Mortgage Lending Process, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1301, 1308 (2010). 
324. Mixon, supra note 8, at 52 n.198. 
325. Id. 
326. Id.  
327. See id. 
328. See id. 
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pricing, and phase II pricing.329  In Chicago, the value of a home in a new 
development could increase from $200,000 to $275,000 and then to $320,000, 
all within the expanse of a year.330  Lenders do not appear to have intervened in 
markets such as Chicago or cities in California to question whether the 
valuations were sound or sustainable.331  To the extent that lenders have failed to 
question valuations, particularly prior to this current economic crisis, they should 
bear the burden of any so-called “deficiencies.”332 
A positive result of having an anti-deficiency statute may be that lenders will 
be more careful in assessing whether appraisers’ valuations are skewed.  Lenders 
will be motivated to be more vigilant in making sure that properties are not 
overvalued and they will be less likely to encourage, indirectly or directly, 
overvaluations.  
E. There are Better Measures than Anti-Deficiency Statutes to Protect  
Borrowers that are Less Intrusive and Burdensome to Lenders  
Some opponents of anti-deficiency laws argue that there are better, less 
intrusive, alternatives that can accomplish the goal of protecting borrowers 
without unduly burdening lenders.333  The alternatives identified often include 
stricter disclosure requirements,334 mortgage counseling,335 personal 
bankruptcy,336 and disqualification of potential borrowers at the outset if they fail 
to signal that they appreciate the accompanying risks.337 
1. Stricter Disclosure and Mortgage Counseling Requirements 
Imposing stricter disclosure and mortgage counseling requirements on 
lenders are positive suggestions.  Such requirements could help to strengthen the 
                                                                                                                                   
329. See Douglas J. Short, Comment, Use Versus Abuse: A Comprehensive Analysis of 
Nonbinding Reservation Agreements and Real Estate Developers’ Ability to Freely Rescind, 30 
CAMPBELL L. REV.  201, 209 (2007). 
330. See Shawn Tully, Welcome to the Dead Zone, CNNMONEY (May 5, 2006, 12:14 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2006/05/03/news/economy/realestateguide_fortune/.  
331. The Ohio Attorney General has investigated the alleged improper “collusion” between 
lenders and appraisers in determining housing values. See Press Release, Office of the Ohio 
Attorney Gen. (June 7, 2007) (on file with author). 
332. Mixon, supra note 8, at 52. 
333. See Jacoby, supra note 31, at 2264 (discussing some of the alternatives); see also 
Hughes, supra note 3, at 128 (suggesting lenders negotiate for and lend at lower loan-to-value 
ratios).  
334. William N. Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1215–17.  
335. Stark, supra note 19, at 131. 
336. Jacoby, supra note 31, at 2264.  
337. Hughes, supra note 3, at 145 (advocating to have lenders “refrain from entering into 
mortgage transactions with borrowers who fail to demonstrate the requisite ability to comprehend 
the lender’s disclosures”). 
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disadvantaged position of the borrower in mortgage loan transactions.338  
Fortifying the disclosure requirements makes sense and could be effective in 
providing the buyer with more of the information he needs to make an intelligent 
decision about his home purchase and in furnishing this information sooner to 
the buyer so that he has time to read and process the information.339  Federal law 
already mandates that lenders make certain disclosures to borrowers regarding 
loan terms, under the Truth in Lending Act,340 and the fees that a borrower will 
be charged along with other financial items that appear on a borrower’s closing 
statement, under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act.341  These mandated 
disclosures are of critical importance but they are insufficient to fully protect 
borrowers.342  Requirements that mortgage loan terms be more transparent and 
that borrowers have an extended opportunity to review loan documents and ask 
questions about them are useful measures that this Article endorses, but they are 
not acceptable substitutes for anti-deficiency legislation.343  Rather, they should 
be viewed as additional measures that can serve to protect consumers.  Requiring 
more rigorous disclosures makes sense because, as it stands now, borrowers are 
at a distinct disadvantage in the unfolding of the real estate loan transaction.344  
Typically, borrowers arrive at a real estate closing and are handed, for the first 
time, complex real estate loan documents that they are directed to sign.345  Few 
borrowers read the documents in detail,346 and even if they do, reading the terms 
does not guarantee comprehension.347  Further, few actually attempt to 
renegotiate the terms of the documents.348  If a borrower attempts to renegotiate, 
it is unlikely that the effort will be successful.349 
There are other factors that shape the borrower’s view of a mortgage loan 
transaction and the borrower’s behavior in the context of that transaction.  A 
borrower’s understanding of the terms may be influenced by a mortgage broker’s 
or lender’s statements that the borrower can always refinance—or worst-case 
                                                                                                                                   
338. See Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1215; see also Stark, supra note 19, at 151 (claiming that 
mandatory mortgage counseling would provide protection to borrowers without limiting their 
choices). 
339. See Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1165. 
340. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1693 (1994). 
341. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2617 (1994).  
342. Jamie Dultz, Note, Battling Discriminatory Lending: Taking a Multidimensional 
Approach Through Litigation, Mediation, and Legislation, 20 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. 
DEV. L. 101, 140–41(2010) (citations omitted). 
343. See Hughes, supra note 3, at 125 (asserting that anti-deficiency legislation is just one tool 
used for the protection of mortgagors). 
344. See Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1086. 
345. Cf. Stark, supra note 19, at 134 (explaining that certain loans are “bad” because they 
contain “exploitive terms that the borrower does not comprehend”). 
346. See id (explaining borrowers have trouble comprehending loan documents due to 
“exploitive terms”). 
347. See id. 
348. See id. at 138 (suggesting mortgagors may need mortgage counseling to know when to 
negotiate better terms). 
349. See id. 
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scenario modify the loan—before the higher rate for an adjustable rate mortgage 
goes into effect or under circumstances of financial setbacks.350  Law Professor 
Debra Stark’s scholarship takes into account the myriad factors that can affect 
borrowers.351  Her proposal directly addresses helping the potential borrower to 
process all the information that is disclosed.352  She persuasively argues that a 
pro-borrower mortgage counselor who has the appropriate level of financial 
training can make a difference by injecting more fairness into the loan process 
and by decreasing the number of predatory loans and foreclosures.353 
Notwithstanding these interventions of more disclosure and competent, effective 
counseling, anti-deficiency legislation is still needed. Requiring lenders to 
disclose more to their customers, highlight unfavorable terms, provide more time 
for document review, and provide counseling are positive steps towards leveling 
the playing field for mortgagors.  However, these modifications are inadequate 
substitutes for providing the borrower with the relief of finality at the other end 
of a transaction, which results in foreclosure.  If a deficiency judgment is not an 
option for the mortgagee, the mortgagor experiences some consolation in 
knowing the painful act of relinquishing the home will be deemed to satisfy the 
loan debt obligation.  
2. Personal Bankruptcy 
Filing for personal bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code,354 (or filing under Chapter 13)355 is a viable option that can 
provide relief to financially distressed mortgagors who need assistance with 
restructuring their debt obligations.356  In some jurisdictions filing for 
bankruptcy can help the mortgagor to either avoid foreclosure or, at the very 
least, delay it so that the mortgagor has more time to occupy the property and 
make alternative living arrangements before the foreclosure is final.357  But it 
comes at a price.358 
                                                                                                                                   
350. See id. at 134 (describing the deceptive practices of predatory lenders). Stark has done 
some work on whether these statements are actionable or mere puffery. See also Jessica M. Choplin 
et al., A Psychological Investigation of Consumer Vulnerability to Fraud: Legal and Policy 
Implications, 35 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 61, 62 (2011) (explaining how consumers may be 
vulnerable to such practices).   
351. See generally Stark, supra note 19 (advocating assistance for borrowers in handling the 
many facets of a mortgage transaction). 
352. Id. at 130. 
353. Id. Stark advocates the adoption of a federal program mandating this type of counseling. 
Id. Her approach serves to close the gap between giving the borrower access to helpful tools and 
ensuring that the borrower makes effective use of those tools. Id.  
354. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(a), 727(a) (2006). 
355. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322. 
356. Hughes, supra note 3, at 147–48. 
357. See Stark, supra note 19, at 139; see also Jacoby, supra note 31, at 2274 (citing 11 U.S.C. 
§362(a) (2012)) (discussing how bankruptcy helps borrowers reinstate delinquent mortgages). 
358. Mixon & Shepard, supra note 9, at 463. 
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Declaring bankruptcy comes at a high psychological price because there is a 
stigma associated with it.359  Bankruptcy also results in a substantial cost to the 
filer’s credit.360  The bankruptcy filing may hinder a mortgagor’s ability to 
obtain financing in the future for a home purchase even though the mortgagor’s 
financial situation may have improved significantly.361  After a personal liability 
judgment is obtained and filed in the county where the debtor has property, 
interest will accumulate on the outstanding amount, making an already hefty 
judgment an even more impossible burden to shoulder.362  Confronted with this 
overwhelming debt, the mortgagor is left with little choice but to declare 
personal bankruptcy.363  It is true that bankruptcy helps the foreclosed 
homeowner find relief from the deficiency judgment364 as well as relief from 
certain federal tax obligations that can be triggered by the foreclosure sale.365  
However, it is a drastic remedy.366  For that reason, it should not be the only 
option available to the defaulting borrower. 
Some legal scholars argue that for foreclosed borrowers, the ability to file 
for bankruptcy essentially operates as “an antideficiency statute.”367  Given that 
borrowers have this vehicle as a means of relief from their creditors, the 
reasoning continues, there is no need to deny lenders the deficiency judgment 
remedy.368  While personal bankruptcy provides borrowers with some relief from 
creditors, it is important to note that it is the deficiency judgment itself that often 
pushes the distressed borrower into bankruptcy.369  There are appreciable 
differences between anti-deficiency laws, which intervene at an earlier moment 
to protect the debtor, as compared to bankruptcy.370  Borrowers can rely upon 
bankruptcy at a later moment of financial impairment in order to obtain relief 
when no other avenues are available.371  While a defaulting homeowner may be 
                                                                                                                                   
359. Mixon & Shepard, supra note 9, at 463; see also White, supra note 259, at 972. 
360. See Mixon & Shepard, supra  note 9, at 463. 
361. Jean Braucher, Counseling Consumer Debtors to Make Their Own Informed Choices—A 
Question of Professional Responsiblity, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 165, 189 (1997). 
362. Mixon & Shepard, supra note 9, at 464. State interest rates can vary from between 6 and 
10 percent. Id. at 464 n.38. 
363. Id. at 463. 
364. Jacoby, supra note 31, at 2272. 
365. Id. at 2288 n.140. 
366. Mixon & Shepard, supra note 9, at 463. 
367. Jacoby, supra note 31, at 2272; see Hughes, supra note 3, at 148 n.171. 
368. See Hughes, supra note 3, at 148. 
369. See Mixon & Shepard, supra note 9, at 461.  This is often the case unless the borrower is 
filing for bankruptcy to prevent or delay the foreclosure. See Jacoby, supra note 31, at 2274 (citing 
11 U.S.C. §362(a) (2012)). 
370. See Mixon & Shepard, supra note 9, at 461 (showing bankruptcy often occurs after anti-
deficiency judgments). 
371. See id. Financially overextended debtors who opt to file for bankruptcy before 
foreclosure proceedings begin may be able to halt or prolong the foreclosure process. See Jacoby, 
supra note 31, at 2274 (citing 11 U.S.C. §362(a) (2012)). Some scholars argue that under 
bankruptcy, the structured plans that are set up to pay one’s creditors could have a better result for 
cash-impaired debtors. See id. at 2283.  
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able to deal with the setback of losing his home to a mortgagee, he may not be 
able to manage this loss and have a hefty personal judgment that will cloud his 
credit for a significant period of time.372  Removal of the deficiency judgment 
threat could serve to decrease the number of individuals who are essentially 
forced into bankruptcy because they see no other option for responding to their 
creditors.373 
3. Disqualifying Potential Borrowers at the Outset 
The third suggestion of disqualifying potential borrowers, at the outset, from 
obtaining loans if they fail to demonstrate some minimum level of economic risk 
intelligence could result in discrimination and an undue limitation on the number 
of people who will be able to purchase houses.  According to this proposal, the 
potential borrower would have to show that the borrower is capable “of 
comprehending the nature or the magnitude of the risks associated with default 
under a mortgage.”374  This approach would likely exclude borrowers who would 
never default on their mortgages because they have enough money to continue 
paying the debt obligation and avoid any financial setbacks that would make 
foreclosure imminent.375  This Article advocates imposing strong underwriting 
requirements and making candid disclosures to individuals who are applying for 
mortgage loans.  Beyond that, this piece does not support adopting a “test” that 
potential borrowers have to pass in order to show the “proper” level of 
understanding regarding the risk being undertaken. Implementing a mortgage 
loan competency test fails to strike at the fundamental problem of inequities in 
the loan transaction that this paper highlights.  Even if a borrower demonstrates 
that the borrower fully appreciates the risks, it does not change the unequal 
bargaining positions of the lender vis à vis the mortgagor.  
F. Anti-deficiency Statutes Will Result in Higher Costs for Borrowers and 
Discourage Lenders from Lending to Certain Communities 
Lenders often maintain that placing restrictions on their ability to recover 
outstanding debt will lead to substantial increases in the price of mortgage loans 
for certain segments of the population—for example, middle and lower income 
communities.376  The higher prices will effectively preclude these groups from 
obtaining financing, or the higher costs will discourage lenders from providing 
                                                                                                                                   
372. See Mixon & Shepard, supra note 9, at 463. 
373. See id. 
374. Hughes, supra note 3, at 144. 
375. See id. at 144–45. 
376. See Durham, supra note 36, at 507–08 (explaining that a prohibition of deficiency 
judgments would shift the burden of increased mortgage costs to “others”). 
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mortgage loans to them.377  Legal scholars have advanced arguments in support 
of the position that prohibiting mortgagees from obtaining deficiency judgments 
will lead to higher mortgage loan costs and, therefore, such laws are 
“inefficient.”378  An important concern for those who argue in terms of efficiency 
is that the transaction costs are borne by all mortgagors but they only benefit 
those who default.379  While it is true that the costs are spread in this way across 
all mortgagors as a group, this piece takes issue with the assertion that the only 
beneficiaries are defaulters.  All borrowers benefit from knowing that such 
protections are in place.380  All borrowers benefit from having peace of mind in 
knowing that there is a limit to the losses they will sustain in the unlikely, but 
possible, event that they default.381  Further, it makes sense to spread costs in this 
way because it should keep the mortgage loan affordable to a wider sector of the 
market of potential borrowers.382  Inoculating the borrower from personal 
liability by precluding deficiency judgments may also assist the borrower in 
making a more accurate assessment of the risks associated with home 
ownership.383  
The lending landscape pre-2007 leading up to the present economic crisis 
included lenders and mortgage loan brokers who assured borrowers that they 
would be able to refinance or modify their loans, if necessary.384  The narratives 
associated with home ownership related to the appreciation of real estate, not the 
rapid and extended decrease in housing values.385  Even if a decline was 
contemplated, many homeowners in recourse states were under the impression 
that the worst-case scenario would be the loss of their homes to the banks, not 
the additional personal liability that a deficiency judgment brings.386  Feeding 
into these assumptions were the prevailing practices in jurisdictions.387  Lenders 
in many states were not actively pursuing deficiency judgments even when the 
outstanding balance was not covered at a foreclosure sale.388  
                                                                                                                                   
377. See Christian E. Weller, Access Denied: Low-Income and Minority Families Face More 
Credit Constraints and Higher Borrowing Costs, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 1 (Aug. 2007), 
http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2007/08/pdf/credit_access.pdf. 
378. See, e.g., Durham, supra note 36, at 493–500 (citations omitted).  In making the case for 
strict foreclosure, law professor James Durham defines “efficiency” as “the utilization of the best 
method of allocating legal rights between parties that choose to engage in the regulated activity.” Id. 
at 505. 
379. See id. at 503 (asserting that “[d]efaulting mortgagors are the only parties who actually 
benefit from mortgagor protection”). 
380. See Gildar, supra note 225, at 1025–26. 
381. See Hughes, supra note 3, at 126. 
382. See id. at 129. 
383. See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 21. 
384. See Singer, supra note 3, at 509; see also Peterson, supra note 184, at 47; see also Simon 
and Hagerty, supra note 191, at A12 (relating anecdotes regarding dishonest mortgage brokers); see 
also Barr, supra note 192 (discussing examples of poor disclosure by brokers). 
385. See Singer, supra note 3, at 500. 
386. Silver-Greenberg, supra note 21. 
387. See id. 
388. See id. 
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Opponents of anti-deficiency laws also argue that if deficiency judgments 
are not allowed, it will mean that, in some instances, mortgagees are not fully 
compensated for their costs, which include, inter alia, the costs of filing the 
foreclosure lawsuit and marketing the property for a foreclosure sale.389  This 
assertion is an incorrect prediction of what is likely to play out on a larger 
scale.390  What is likely to happen is that lenders will find a way to efficiently 
price their loss of the deficiency judgment into the cost of the loans.391  If 
mortgagees cannot recuperate their costs on the back-end through deficiency 
judgments, they will charge more for their loans on the front end as a way of 
protecting themselves from shortfalls.392  Lenders’ reliance on this compensating 
strategy does not necessarily mean that mortgage loans will become 
“unaffordable” to the middle class.393  For those states that are non-recourse or 
that have adopted anti-deficiency provisions, there is apparently no empirical 
evidence to suggest that mortgages are not as readily available to the middle 
class in those regions as compared to other states without the protections.394  The 
California market may serve as an example.  The existence of anti-deficiency 
statutes in California has not deterred lenders from lending to middle and lower 
income individuals within this State.395  On the contrary, it appears that the 
                                                                                                                                   
389. Durham, supra note 36, at 502–503, 506–508.  
390. See Schill, supra note 37, at 496–97 (citing Mark Meador, The Effects of Mortgage Laws 
on Home Mortgage Rates, 34 J. ECON. & BUS. 143, 146) (1982). Schill focuses on the work of 
Mark Meador, which suggests that state laws protecting borrowers substantially raises the price of 
credit for consumers. Meador, supra, at 146. Schill counters Mark Meador’s conclusion that anti-
deficiency statutes have a measurable impact on the interest rate of mortgage loans by as much as 
“22.65 basis points.” Schill, supra note 24, at 496–97, 497 n.29 (citing Meador, supra, at 146).  See 
also George M. Platt, Deficiency Judgments in Oregon Loans Secured by Land: Growing Disparity 
Among Functional Equivalents, 23 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 37, 52 (1987) (“Lending institutions 
maintain large loan portfolios over which the risk of losses may be spread.”).  
391. See Schill, supra note 37, at 507. (“If mortgagor protection laws generate substantial 
costs, economic theory suggests that lenders in a competitive market will pass these costs along to 
borrowers.”). 
392. Id. 
393. See id. at 511. (“[I]t is impossible to predict, ex ante, the expected relationship between 
household income and interest rates.”) 
394. Cf. Nina Liao, Note, Cramming Down the Housing Crisis: Amending 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1322(b) to Protect Homeowners and Create a Sustainable Bankruptcy System, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
2240, 2255 (2009) (citing The Looming Foreclosure Crisis: How to Help Families Save Their 
Homes: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 196 (2007) (testimony of 
Henry J. Sommer, President, National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys) (discussing 
a lack of evidence showing that “cram-down,” a feature of bankruptcy law that is similar to anti-
deficiency provisions, has affected the price and availability of mortgages)).  
395. Writing in 1991, legal scholar John Mixon commented that: 
 
One might expect that, in a rational microeconomic system, mortgagees would 
require greater down payments, extract higher interest [rates] on home loans, 
and withhold mortgage financing in areas where the risk of market downturn is 
shifted to them. This appears, however, not to be the case, inasmuch as 
institutional lenders apply the same rates and terms to California houses as to 
the rest of the country. 
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middle-class has enjoyed extensive access to mortgage loans.396  Regarding 
individuals within lower income groups, lenders have made loans available to 
them although not always as freely and consistently as compared to middle-
income borrowers.397  The availability of loans in the California market to a 
mixed range of income levels supports the position that, if lenders perceive that 
they can make money on providing mortgage loans, they will continue to make 
them available to lower, middle, and upper income individuals.398  Although the 
underwriting requirements may be more stringent in certain cases, it is unlikely 
that lenders would lock such a large sector of the population—that is, the middle 
class—out of the loan market indefinitely.399  
The conclusion that anti-deficiency protection measures do not result in 
mortgage loans that are priced at a prohibitively high level for the middle-
income market is supported by Michael Schill’s work.400  Schill concludes that 
there is no substantial negative impact on mortgage loan interest rates that can be 
attributed to the adoption of anti-deficiency laws or other pro-debtor mortgage 
mechanisms.401  Further, Schill argues that it is important to evaluate pro-debtor 
laws, like anti-deficiency statutes, for the effect that they have for borrowers 
obtaining financing at the time, and not from the perspective of any rippling 
after-effects of the laws.402  Viewed from this vantage point, Schill maintains 
that anti-deficiency and redemption laws can be likened to “insurance” for 
mortgagors because the laws operate to put a cap on the amount of losses that 
mortgagors may suffer due to the occurrence of events that are not within their 
control—for example, severe economic contractions or change of life events 
such as divorce or illness.403  If individuals know that their maximum amount of 
loss to the mortgagee in the event of their default will be the concrete asset of the 
house, then they are more inclined to continue participating in the housing 
market economy.404  This piece shares Schill’s conclusion that, because the laws 
                                                                                                                                   
 
Mixon, supra note 8, at 37. 
396. According to the American Bankers Association, the average percentage of 1–4 family 
loans made to first time home buyers in 2013 increased to thirteen percent from eleven percent in 
2012 and nine percent in 2011. AM. BANKERS ASS’N, 21ST ANNUAL ABA REAL ESTATE LENDING 
SURVEY REPORT 15 (2014). 
397. See generally Weller, supra note 377 (discussing barriers to home financing for low 
income borrowers). 
398. See Mixon, supra note 8. See generally AM. BANKERS ASS’N, supra note 227 (discussing 
the recent increase in loans made to first time buyers despite regulatory obstacles). 
399. Mixon, supra note 8. 
400. Schill, supra note 37, at 514. 
401. Id. at 514. The results of Schill’s “net present value simulation model of mortgage 
lending” indicate that “home mortgage loan interest rates are relatively insensitive to the existence 
of mortgagor protection laws and that the incremental costs of these laws are likely to be quite 
modest.” Id. at 490–91. 
402. Id. at 498. 
403. Id. at 500 (citing Alan Schwartz, The Enforceability of Security Interests in Consumer 
Goods, 26 J.L. & ECON. 117, 125–29 (1983). 
404. Id. at 500. 
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result in more predictive outcomes for mortgagors, they are more conducive to 
“economic efficiency.”405  
VI. PROPOSAL FOR ANTI-DEFICIENCY LAW FOR RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE 
LOANS 
This Article proposes a legislative solution to the problems that deficiency 
judgments pose.  The beginning place for the anti-deficiency law proposal is 
from the position that lenders should not be able to pursue deficiency judgments 
against residential loan borrowers.  At the federal or state level, legislators 
should enact laws prohibiting deficiency judgments in the residential mortgage 
loan transaction. 406  By properly defining “residential mortgages” legislators can 
address any concerns that the anti-deficiency legislation will cast too broad of a 
net that would encompass sophisticated real estate investors who don’t suffer the 
same disadvantages in terms of market knowledge, and who will take advantage 
of the protections to the detriment of lenders.  Apart from the legislative action, 
lenders can cushion themselves against unsustainable losses related to the 
prohibition of this remedy by making sufficient adjustments in their underwriting 
requirements—for example, loan to value ratios, required down payment, etc. 
A. Elements of the Anti-Deficiency Law Proposal 
The elements of the anti-deficiency law proposal advocated in this paper are: 
1) All residential mortgage loans qualify for protection against 
deficiency judgment liability. 
2) The borrower’s cessation of occupancy or subsequent rental of the 
property purchased with financing that qualifies for anti-deficiency 
protection does not change or eliminate that protected status. 
3) The refinancing of a residential mortgage loan qualifies for the 
same level of protection against a deficiency judgment as that of the 
original residential purchase money mortgage loan. 
                                                                                                                                   
405. Id. at 538. 
406. For the definition of “residential,” the Uniform Land Security Interest Act provides a 
useful one that reads: 
 
“Residential real estate” means, in relation to a protected party, real estate 
improved or to be improved, containing not more than [three] acres, not more 
than four dwelling units, and no nonresidential uses for which the protected 
party is a lessor.  If a unit in a common interest community is otherwise 
“residential real estate,” it remains so regardless of the size of, or the number 
of units in, the common interest community. 
 
UNIF. LAND SEC. INTEREST ACT § 113(b) (amended 1999), 7A U.L.A. 403, 426 (1985 & 
Supp. 1991). 
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4) The guarantors of a residential mortgage loan have the same level of 
protection as the residential mortgage loan with respect to 
deficiency judgments.  
5) The anti-deficiency protections are not waivable. 
B. Distinguishing the Proposal from Some Prominent Models 
There have been previous attempts to modify the remedies that are available 
to lenders in conjunction with foreclosure proceedings.  Two prominent models 
can be found in the Uniform Land Security Interest Act (“ULSIA”)407 and 
section 8.4 of The Restatement (Third) of the Law of Property Mortgages.408 
Neither of these models fully eradicates deficiency judgments.409  Instead, they 
interpose criteria for when and how deficiency judgments may apply to a 
mortgagor whose property has been foreclosed.410 
This paper articulates a proposal that differs in scope and approach from 
ULSIA and Restatement (Third) models for anti-deficiency protection.  For the 
reasons stated in the following sections, those models are insufficient to fully 
address the unequal position of the borrower in the residential mortgage loan 
process.  Given that this anti-deficiency proposal extends beyond models that 
have not enjoyed widespread adoption, it is important to acknowledge that the 
lukewarm reception to previous reform efforts suggests that there are substantial 
barriers to change.  Those barriers include the powerful banking industry lobby, 
differences in economic policy, the inertia of legislators, and an unwillingness to 
change the status quo.411  This Article recognizes the hurdles that the anti-
deficiency law proposal will likely confront, but nonetheless asserts that the 
unequal bargaining relationship between lenders and borrowers is at a crisis 
point and must be addressed.  At the outset of this Article, it was noted that 
governmental action is permissible in the realm of contracts where certain 
conditions prevail.  Here, those conditions are satisfied given that there is a 
lending industry whose members function as dominant parties in residential loan 
negotiations: they (i) are in a superior position with respect to having pertinent 
knowledge relative to the contemplated mortgage loan and housing purchase 
transaction, (ii) have the almost exclusive power to structure the mortgage loan 
and decide whether to make the loan to an applicant based upon the terms they 
set, (iii) are incentivized by the prevailing legal and economic regime to 
                                                                                                                                   
407. Id. at §§ 501–511. 
408. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTG. §§ 8.1–8.6 (1997). 
409. See UNIF. LAND SEC. INTEREST ACT § 511(b) (amended 1999), 7A U.L.A. 403, 468 
(1985 & Supp. 1991); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTG. § 8.4 cmt. a (1997). 
410. UNIF. LAND SEC. INTEREST ACT § 511 cmt. 2 (amended 1999), 7A U.L.A. 403, 468–69 
(1985 & Supp. 1991); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.4 cmt. a–d (1997). 
411. See Norman Geis, Escape from the 15th Century: Uniform Land Security Interest Act, 30 
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J., 289, 316–17 (1995). 
2014] REALLOCATING RISK AND DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT LIABILITY 303 
maximize their gains even if it forces defaulted mortgagors into bankruptcy and 
undermines their ability to be fully-engaged consumers for a substantial period 
of time, and (iv) have the ability to address the losses associated with the 
intervention.  
1. The Uniform Land Security Interest Act: The Limitations of ULSIA 
in Providing Mortgagors with Deficiency Judgment Relief 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
promulgated ULSIA in 1985.412  To date, no state has adopted ULSIA.413  
Section 511(b) contains the key language relative to deficiency judgments.414 
ULSIA, in contrast to this Article’s proposal, does not prohibit deficiency 
judgments.415  Rather, it delineates a protected party status.416  If a mortgagor 
falls within the definition of a “protected party” then the mortgagor is shielded 
from deficiency judgment liability. Section 511(b) provides: 
Unless otherwise agreed and except as provided in this subsection as to 
protected parties, a person who owes payment of an obligation secured 
is liable for any deficiency.  If that person is a protected party and the 
obligation secured is a purchase money security interest, there is no 
liability for a deficiency, notwithstanding any agreement of the 
protected party.  For purposes of calculating the amount of any 
deficiency a transfer of the real estate to a person who is liable to the 
creditor under a guaranty, endorsement, repurchase agreement, or the 
like is not a sale.417 
                                                                                                                                   
412. See UNIF. LAND SEC. INTEREST ACT historical notes (amended 1999), 7A U.L.A. 403, 
403 (1985 & Supp. 1991).  
413. While no states have yet adopted ULSIA, some scholars have made compelling 
arguments in favor of its adoption across the country.  See Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., The Future of 
American Real Estate Law: Uniform Foreclosure Laws and Uniform Land Security Interest Act, 20 
NOVA L. REV. 1109, 1131–32 (1996). The reasons for the failure to adopt ULSIA are not 
necessarily a sign that there is no political will for nonrecourse laws statewide but, rather, may 
relate to several other reasons such as: (i) the powerful lobby of mortgagees are likely to resist any 
legislative measures that will curtail their advantage in mortgage loan transactions, and (ii) the 
particular idiosyncrasies of each state’s current mortgage laws that may make it difficult to embrace 
the positives of ULSIA (e.g., Section 511(b)) without some other aspect of ULSIA supplanting the 
positives of the state’s mortgage laws. See Geis, supra note 411, at 316–17.  
414. See UNIF. LAND SEC. INTEREST ACT § 511(b) (amended 1999), 7A U.L.A. 403, 468 
(1985 & Supp. 1991). 
415. Section 511(b) provides in relevant part: “Unless otherwise agreed and except as 
provided in this subsection as to protected parties, a person who owes payment of an obligation 
secured is liable for any deficiency.” Id. 
416. Id. § 113(a). 
417. Id. § 511(b). 
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The positive aspects of ULSIA are that it recognizes the need to prohibit 
deficiency judgments under certain circumstances, and its protections cannot be 
waived.418  Making the provision unwaivable is important because, as this article 
highlights, mortgagors are in a disadvantageous position relative to lenders in the 
real estate loan deal.419  Borrowers, due to the failure to read all their loan 
documents carefully at the closing or a misunderstanding of the complicated 
terminology used in the documents, may waive this protection and not realize 
it.420  This Article’s critique of ULSIA is that it is too limited in its focus.  
Section 113(a) of ULSIA defines “protected party” as follows: 
 
(1) an individual who gives a security interest in residential real 
estate all or a part of which the individual occupies or intends to occupy 
as a residence; 
(2) a person obligated primarily or secondarily on an obligation 
secured by residential real estate if, at the time the obligation is incurred 
that person is related to an individual who occupies or intends to occupy 
all or a part of the real estate as a residence; or (3) an individual who 
acquires residential real estate and assumes or takes subject to the 
obligation of a prior protected party under the real estate security 
agreement.421 
 
Section 113(a) has positive aspects that appropriately accord protection to 
individuals who should be shielded from personal liability.422  This proposal 
suggests broadening the scope of protection.  The goal is to provide borrowers 
with relief.  While paragraph (1) protects those individuals who occupy or intend 
to occupy the mortgaged property,423 it should be broadened so that anti-
deficiency protection is extended to those individuals who, at one time, did 
occupy the property but relocated due to job or family related reasons.  
Individuals who are no longer occupying property they purchased for that 
purpose should still be able to take advantage of continuing non-recourse 
protections.  This protection should be extended even if the person is no longer 
living in the state where the property is situated.  The protection should also 
remain in place if the mortgagor is renting out the property.  Mortgagees often 
reclassify property that fits the latter description as “investment property.”424  
                                                                                                                                   
418. Id. § 501(d). 
419. See Mixon, supra note 8, at 88. 
420. See id. 
421. UNIF. LAND SEC. INTEREST ACT § 113(a) (amended 1999), 7A U.L.A. 403, 425–26 
(1985 & Supp. 1991). 
422. Id. § 113(a) cmt. 1–4. 
423. Id. § 113(a)(1). 
424. Id. § 113(b)(1). This category of “investment property” is typically subject to stricter 
limits and standards regarding the evaluation of the property for refinancing purposes. While it is 
not clear that ULSIA’s protection extends to a person under all the scenarios identified above, 
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Instead of automatically reclassifying the property in this way, mortgagees 
should consider whether the purchaser initially bought the property with the 
intent to occupy it.  While determinations of intent can be difficult and costly, 
the test could be reduced to some limited period of required occupancy for the 
purchaser.  
This proposed anti-deficiency law would not disqualify individuals who had 
previous foreclosures from non-recourse protection.  Lenders would be privy to 
that information because it is a matter of public record, and could make a risk 
assessment as to whether to extend the loan.  
Paragraph (2) of Section 113(a) contemplates encompassing guarantors 
within its protection.425  Under the approach put forth by this Article, guarantors 
of the mortgage loan also would be protected. In addition, individual guarantors, 
even if they are not “related to an individual who occupies or intends to occupy” 
the property, would be included.426  Including guarantors under the protective 
umbrella of anti-deficiency statutes closes a loophole like the one that currently 
exists in California’s anti-deficiency statutes.427  This type of loophole invites 
exploitation by mortgagees in order to circumvent the purposes of the anti-
deficiency laws.428  The Restatement of the Law (Third) on Property and 
Mortgages also recognizes the fairness of extending to guarantors the same anti-
deficiency protections that have been granted to mortgagors.429  As the 
Restatement comments, “[t]o permit the mortgagee to recover a deficiency 
judgment against the latter persons [that is, guarantors, sureties] unrestricted by 
                                                                                                                                   
Section 511(b)’s reach does cover “owner-occupied fourplexes and second homes.” Mixon & 
Shepard, supra note 9, at 481 (citing id.). 
425. UNIF. LAND SEC. INTEREST ACT § 113(a)(2) (amended 1999), 7A U.L.A. 403, 426 (1985 
& Supp. 1991). 
426. Section 114 of the ULSIA outlines the “related to” status. Id. § 114.  
427. California’s protections do not automatically extend to guarantors of mortgage loans, 
particularly if they have waived certain protections, but they should. See Weissman, supra note 132, 
at 59–60. See also Paradise Land & Cattle Co. v. McWilliams Enter., Inc., 959 F.2d 1463, 1465–66 
(9th Cir. 1992) (citing Spangler v. Memel, 498 P.2d 1055, 1059 (1972); Palm v. Schilling, 244 Cal. 
Rptr. 600, 601 (1988)) (observing holdings that establish California’s anti-deficiency statute’s 
applicability to purchase-money obligations in real property transactions in which the obligation is 
secured by the purchased property, and does not apply to guarantees of such obligations)Talbott v. 
Hustwitt, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 703, 705 (2008) (quoting Mariners Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Neil, 99 Cal. 
Rptr. 238, 240 (1971)) (“Since section 580a has to do solely with actions for recovery of deficiency 
judgments on the principal obligation [it] has no application to an action against a guarantor . . . ”); 
Kincaid v. Gomez, 274 Cal. Rptr. 539, 540 (1969) (citing Roberts v. Graves, 75 Cal. Rptr. 130, 134 
(1969)); Jonathan Manor, Inc. v. Artisan, Inc., 56 Cal Rptr. 14, 16 (1967); Heckes v. Sapp, 40 Cal. 
Rptr. 485, 487 (1964) (“If respondent were guarantors, section 580b would not protect them.”). 
Further, guarantors are also permitted to waive any defenses or protections that the California laws 
may provide. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2856(a)(3) (West Supp. 1984) (allowing waivers by 
guarantors of rights and defenses if the principal obligation is secured by real property). 
428. Weissman, supra note 132, at 61. 
429. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.4 cmt. b (1997). 
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the limitations of [§ 8.4] Subsection (c) would be inconsistent with the goal of 
preventing unjust enrichment of the mortgagee.”430  
This paper’s anti-deficiency proposal also differs from ULSIA’s method in 
the way it treats individuals who renegotiate their loan contracts.  This proposal 
would grant continuing anti-deficiency protection to individuals who refinance.  
In contrast, ULSIA denies anti-deficiency protection to individuals who 
refinance their residential mortgage loans.431  Only purchase money mortgages 
are covered by ULSIA’s anti-deficiency provision.432  Using the phrase 
“purchase money security interest,” ULSIA refers to the security interest in 
relation to the “purchase money security agreement,” which is defined as an 
agreement that is: 
 
(i) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of 
its price or (ii) taken by a person other than the seller of the collateral 
who, by making an advance or incurring an obligation, gives value to 
enable the debtor to acquire the collateral.433 
 
As Professor Roger Bernhardt discusses, Comment 2 to ULSIA § 511 
suggests that individuals who refinance lose their protected status because the 
loans no longer qualify as purchase money security interests.434  Yet, there are 
real drawbacks to excluding individuals who refinance from the protected party 
class.435  In order to ensure the widest possible coverage of an anti-deficiency 
                                                                                                                                   
430. Id. Section 8.4 provides that mortgagees may request the use of fair market value, as of 
the date of the foreclosure sale, to calculate a deficiency rather than the foreclosure sale price. The 
comment refers to those instances in which the fair market value exceeds the mortgage obligation. 
Id. § 8.4 cmt. b, illus. 2–6 (1997).  
431. UNIF. LAND SEC. INTEREST ACT § 511, cmt. 2 (amended 1999), 7A U.L.A. 403, 468 
(1985 & Supp. 1991). 
432. Id. § 511(b) & § 511 cmt. 2. For a discussion of some of the downsides of this limitation 
see Mixon & Shepard, supra note 9 at 481 (citing Id. § 511 cmt. 2). It is important to acknowledge 
that ULSIA is now more than twenty years old. While the drafters did not include individuals who 
refinance within the ambit of anti-deficiency protection, given the apparent problems that this group 
faces, it is unlikely that the drafters would exclude this category, today.  
433. Id. § 111(18). 
434. Roger Bernhardt, ULSIA’s Remedies on Default—Worth the Effort?, 24 CONN. L. REV. 
1001, 1044–45 (1992). 
435. Bernhardt observes: 
 
If refinancing truly eliminates purchase-money status as the Commissioners 
believe, it would not be hard for lenders to move their loans from one category 
to the other when the need arises. There is also the philosophical question of 
why homeowners should be protected only with regard to their purchase-
money loans, which may well be the most discretionary form of borrowing 
they undertake. Homeowners who need to refinance in order to survive a 




2014] REALLOCATING RISK AND DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT LIABILITY 307 
measure, the likelihood that borrowers will want to refinance at some point 
should be taken into account, and a clear statement of whether this results in a 
loss of their protected status should be articulated.436  Legal scholar Carol Burns 
astutely argues, regarding California’s anti-deficiency laws, that the rational 
actions of taking advantage of lower interest rates or more stable loan products—
for example, a fixed rate loan instead of an adjustable rate mortgage—should not 
be penalized.437  An anti-deficiency law that allows broader protection would 
lessen the occurrence of foreclosures because individuals would be able to make 
the adjustments they need in their mortgage loans in order to continue making 
their payments.  A decrease in foreclosures is an efficient outcome that benefits 
the broader economy because it contributes to the stability of the housing 
market.438 
2. The Restatement (Third) of Law Approach 
The Restatement’s approach to deficiency judgments and anti-deficiency 
legislation differs drastically from this proposal. The Restatement’s technique for 
balancing the interests of borrowers and lenders is to permit deficiency 
judgments, but limit them in a way that reflects the value of the property rather 
than merely the price paid at the foreclosure sale.439  Section 8.4, paragraph (a) 
of the Restatement provides: “If the foreclosure sale price is less than the unpaid 
balance of the mortgage obligation, an action may be brought to recover a 
deficiency judgment against any person who is personally liable on the mortgage 
obligation in accordance with the provisions of this section.”440 
As an alternative measure to modify the potential deficiency amount, the 
Restatement permits the foreclosed mortgagor to rely upon the reference point of 
“fair market value of the real estate as of the date of the foreclosure sale,”441 
rather than using the foreclosure sale price against the outstanding debt.  The 
Restatement defines “fair market value” as “the price which would result from 
negotiation and mutual agreement, after ample time to find a purchaser, between 
a vendor who is willing, but not compelled to sell, and a purchaser who is 
willing to buy, but not compelled to take a particular piece of real estate.”442  If 
this alternative value exceeds the foreclosure sale price, the mortgagor can use 
the excess—that is, the difference between the fair market value and the 
                                                                                                                                   
436. Prior to the 2012 amendment, which clearly grants protection to those who refinance their 
purchase money mortgage for the same property, the lack of clarity in California’s anti-deficiency 
provisions regarding the status of individuals who refinanced caused confusion and prompted 
litigation over whether such individuals are insulated from personal liability. See Burns, supra note 
98, at 2080. 
437. Id. at 2111.  
438. Id. at 2079. 
439. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.4 cmt. a (1997). 
440. Id. § 8.4(a). 
441. Id. § 8.4.  
442. Id. § 8.3, cmt. b. 
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foreclosure sale price—to offset the deficiency amount.443  In this respect, the 
Restatement’s approach corresponds to the fair value limitation discussed above 
in Section III. Comment a to the Restatement describes the rationale behind this 
strategy: 
 
This approach enables the mortgagee to be made whole where the 
mortgaged real estate is insufficient to satisfy the mortgage obligation, 
but at the same time protects against the mortgagee purchasing the 
property at a deflated price, obtaining a deficiency judgment and, by 
reselling the real estate at a profit, achieving a recovery that exceeds the 
obligation.  Thus, it is aimed primarily at preventing the unjust 
enrichment of the mortgagee.444 
 
As argued in Section III, while the fair market value approach affords the 
mortgagor some protection, it has its shortcomings.  First, the reliance upon fair 
market value, rather than the foreclosure sale price is not automatic under the 
Restatement’s model.445  The mortgagor has to request that the alternative 
measure be used.446  Putting the onus on the mortgagor means that he has to be 
aware that it is his right to have another basis used to calculate the deficiency 
judgment.  When the responsibility falls upon the mortgagor, the protective 
mechanism is subject to being underutilized due to a lack of knowledge about its 
existence.  It is likely that many mortgagors will not have legal counsel.447  Just 
as mortgagors who would benefit from the Illinois Special Matters provisions 
routinely fail to request them,448 it is probable that mortgagors will not invoke 
the fair market value option, absent some requirement that the mortgagor be 
informed that this alternative is available.  Second, the Restatement provides that 
                                                                                                                                   
443. Section 8.4 (d) provides: 
 
If it is determined that the fair market value is greater than the foreclosure sale 
price, the persons against whom recovery of the deficiency is sought are 
entitled to an offset against the deficiency in the amount by which the fair 
market value, less the amount of any liens on the real estate that were not 
extinguished by the foreclosure, exceeds the sale price. 
 
Id. § 8.4(d). 
444. Id. § 8.4(d) cmt. a. 
445. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.4 cmt. b (1997). (“The fair market 
value determination of this section is not self-executing. Unless the deficiency defendant 
affirmatively requests such a determination, the foreclosure sale price, rather than the property’s fair 
market value, will be used to compute the deficiency.”). 
446. Id. 
447. See Rachel M. Zahorsky, Biloxi Blues: Legal Cost Fears Have Victims of Oil Spill 
Sliding Out of the Middle Class, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1, 2012, at 45, 48 (discussing increased reluctance 
and inability of middle-class individuals to pay for legal representation even when faced with 
complex legal matters).  
448. Stark, supra note 19, at 671. 
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fair market value may be determined by a judge or a jury449 by relying upon a 
“variety of approaches,” including any of the three appraisal methods—
comparable sales, income, and cost—commonly used by appraisers in property 
valuation.450  While the Restatement’s fair market value strategy allows for a 
broader view of property value that offers some protection to borrowers, it does 
not eliminate the possibility of a personal liability judgment.  According to 
Comment c, the foreclosure proceeding cannot impact fair market value.451 
However, this restriction does not mean that other foreclosures, within the 
geographic area of the property are precluded from negatively affecting the fair 
market value determination.  If the neighborhood has suffered multiple 
foreclosures or the overall region is plagued by depressed property values as a 
result of a recession, then using the fair market value is unlikely to provide a 
significant reduction in the deficiency amount.  
3. An Alternative Approach: Creating a Special Insurance for 
Borrowers to Cover Deficiency Judgments 
Professor Schill proposes another approach to providing anti-deficiency 
protection to borrowers.452  Moving beyond the analogy of anti-deficiency laws, 
Schill’s noteworthy proposal is to implement an actual insurance program 
whereby borrowers can purchase insurance coverage as protection against the 
contingency of deficiency judgment liability.453  This type of insurance would be 
different from private mortgage insurance (“PMI”),454 for which many 
mortgagors pay premiums but which operate to protect the lender “against losses 
in the event of default.”455  Instead of insulating the borrower, the PMI just shifts 
a portion of the risk from the lender to the insurer but it does not eliminate the 
risk exposure the borrower has in the event that the borrower suffers a 
                                                                                                                                   
449. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTG. § 8.4, reporter’s note (1997) 
(acknowledging that some states allow a jury to make the determination but taking no position on 
the issue). 
450. Id. § 8.4 cmt c. According to the reporter’s note the fair market value approach relied 
upon is attributable to the case BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp. Id. § 8.4 Reporter’s Note (citing BFP 
v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537–538 (1994)).  
451. Id. § 8.4(d) cmt. c. 
452. See Schill, supra note 37, at 531. 
453. Id. 
454. In addition to being available from private mortgage insurers, this type of insurance is 
also provided by the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”) and the Veterans Administration 
(“VA”).  As Nelson, Whitman, et al., explain, with an FHA insured loan the FHA “collects 
insurance premiums from borrowers . . . These premiums, along with proceeds from the sale of 
foreclosed properties, pay for claims that FHA pays lenders as a result of foreclosures.” NELSON & 
WHITMAN, supra note 59, at 951. 
455. Id. Private mortgage insurers “will pay all the losses [of the lender] from a foreclosure up 
to a stated percentage of the claim amount . . . [usually] between 25 percent and 35 percent of the 
claim amount.” Id. 
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foreclosure and there is a deficiency. 456  In contrast, the proposed consumer-
focused insurance is intended to insulate the borrower from the deficiency 
risk.457 
Rather than rely upon lenders to devise an efficient deficiency judgment 
program, Schill proposes a state-mandated “mortgage foreclosure insurance” 
program. Under the program, mortgagors would be required to buy mortgage 
foreclosure insurance to cover the deficiency amount.458  There are positive 
aspects to this proposal in that insurance formalizes and quantifies borrowers’ 
risks.459  Requiring borrowers to purchase insurance and pay ongoing premiums 
should make visible and tangible for them their exposure to personal liability.460  
An insurance requirement would also mean that mortgagors who default are 
covered in the event that the lender obtains a deficiency judgment against 
them.461  Notwithstanding the positives, making the costs of the risk of default 
more apparent has its downsides.  Borrowers are likely to be resistant to the 
imposition of the insurance requirement and may campaign against it.462  They 
are likely to discount their own likelihood of default, and may push to undermine 
any efforts to implement a mandatory insurance program.463 
This Article advocates excluding deficiency judgments as a negotiable term 
in residential mortgage loan contracts over an insurance-structured approach. 
While an obligatory state insurance program meets some of the desired 
                                                                                                                                   
456. As John Mixon explains, “[b]ecause the mortgagee or mortgage insurer (or both, as their 
interests appear) holds the ultimate right to collect any deficiency remaining after foreclosure, 
mortgage insurance does not benefit the mortgagor in default.” Mixon, supra note 8, at 19.  
457. See Schill, supra note 37, at 535. 
458. Id. (citing Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
509, 548–49 (1986). Schill concludes that certain consumer protective measures—for example, 
special deficiency judgment insurance—are best relegated to the government because lenders, left to 
their own devices, will not create properly priced safeguards for mortgagors to match their 
likelihood of default. For example, if lenders offered insurance to cover deficiency judgments for 
the benefit of borrowers, lenders are likely to overcharge mortgagors who are less likely to default, 
and undercharge mortgagors who are financially riskier. According to Schill, this discrepancy 
occurs because of “imperfect information” between lenders and borrowers. Lenders have 
information about trends of markets and defaults whereas individual borrowers have information 
about the specific factors—for example, handling of their household budget, spending habits and 
projects, and assets that impact their ability to pay. Another problem regarding pricing the insurance 
is that borrowers may incorrectly assess probability of defaulting on their loans. That is to say, 
borrowers who are less likely to default given their financial condition may be overly cautious and 
will purchase more insurance than they need whereas borrowers who are more likely to default, 
given their income, assets, and job stability, will likely purchase less insurance than they need 
because they are overly optimistic about their probability of defaulting. Id. at 523. Schill suggests 
that a mandatory state-directed program will ensure that there is a sustainable market for the 
insurance and that “the costs of mortgagor protections are borne by the mortgagors [who most need 
the protections] through insurance premiums.” Id. at 537. 
459. Id. at 536. 
460. Id. 
461. Id. at 535. 
462. See id. at 536. 
463. See id., at 537. 
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objectives, the most efficient strategy that serves the public is the enactment of 
anti-deficiency laws.464  An anti-deficiency law incentivizes lenders to use the 
mechanisms available to them, such as modifying their underwriting 
requirements or adjusting the pricing of their loan products, to account for any 
estimated losses associated with anti-deficiency protection.465  Relying upon the 
legislative approach of prohibiting deficiency judgments addresses the concern 
that lenders will underbid the property at a foreclosure sale to create a 
deficiency.466  This plan also avoids any potential issues that can arise with the 
administration of an insurance program.  Under an insurance scheme, insurers 
may write contracts in a way that severely limits the ability of the insured to 
receive insurance proceeds—for example, the deductible may be too high.  Thus, 
financially-strapped insureds may lose the full benefits of their coverage if they 
fail to stay current on their premiums, or insurers may delay the payout process 
to the point of the insured having to file for bankruptcy because of financial 
pressures.467  This Article’s proposal affords blanket protection for all residential 
mortgagors against deficiency judgment liability.  
C. Scope of the Proposal—Prospective Application and Limited 
Retroactive Application  
The scope of this proposal differs from that of ULSIA, which has a 
prospective focus.468  This proposal is not limited to prospective application. 
Instead, it takes into account the timing of the present recession to allow for the 
refinancing or modification of existing mortgage loan contracts that were entered 
into by January 1, 2006.469  The retroactive aspect is even more controversial 
than the prospective portion and will undoubtedly raise freedom of contract 
concerns.470  Judging from the severe limits imposed on recent government-
                                                                                                                                   
464. Lenders are likely to mount substantial resistance to any proposal to prohibiting 
deficiency judgments because they will view it as an attempt to impair their right to freely contract. 
Nonetheless, this Article encourages the government to adopt such anti-deficiency legislation. The 
insurance approach should be held in abeyance as an alternative option if the proposal encounters 
such resistance that the adoption of anti-deficiency legislation proves impossible.  
465. Dening, supra note 83. 
466. See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 21. 
467. Id. 
468. Mixon & Shepard, supra note 9, at 456 (citing UNIF. LAND SEC. INTEREST ACT § 601 
(amended 1999), 7A U.L.A. 403, 468 (1985 & Supp. 1991)). 
469. The date, January 1, 2006, was selected based upon the ample evidence of clear moments 
during which numerous lenders were engaging in practices of heightened predatory lending, and lax 
underwriting standards that contributed heavily to the financially debilitated condition of many 
borrowers. See Bernanke, supra note 38. See also Brown, supra note 38, at 1217–18 (noting that 
subprime mortgages, as a share of total originations, increased from 9 percent to 20 percent from 
1996 to 2006). 
470. Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the United States provides: “No state 
shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
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endorsed homeowner mortgage relief programs,471 a proposal to modify loans 
retroactively is likely to meet substantial resistance from the lending industry 
and others.  Notwithstanding the hurdles, this type of drastic measure is 
warranted and should be given serious consideration.  Further, there is precedent 
for it.472  During the Great Depression era, the United States Supreme Court, in 
Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, upheld the state of 
Minnesota’s decision to temporarily prohibit lenders from pursuing their 
remedies against homeowners who had defaulted on their mortgages.473  The 
Blaisdell Court reasoned that “[economic] conditions may . . . arise in which a 
temporary restraint of enforcement of contracts will be consistent with the spirit 
and purpose of the contract clause, and thus be within the range of the reserved 
power of the State to protect the vital interests of the community.”474  The 
Minnesota State Legislature’s declaration of an “economic emergency”475 was 
significant to the Court’s holding.476  At present, in the United States, there is an 
                                                                                                                                   
471. See the requirements for the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP) and the two 
Home Affordable Modification Programs (“HAMP I” and “HAMP II”). Questions and Answers, 
HARPPROGRAM.ORG, http://www.harpprogram.org/faq.php (last visited Oct. 6, 2014); Home 
Affordable Modification Program, MAKINGHOMEAFFORDABLE.ORG, http://www.making 
homeaffordable.gov/programs/lower-payments/Pages/hamp.aspx (last updated Sept. 4, 2014). The 
lackluster results of the programs, which have only helped a relatively miniscule number of 
homeowners, suggest that bolder measures are needed to adequately tackle the crisis many 
mortgagors are facing. See Dewan, supra note 194. 
472. In contract law, there is the good faith and fair dealing requirement that courts read into 
the transaction regardless of whether the parties expressly state that this is a condition to which the 
parties must adhere. The Blaisdell Court recognized the historical precedents, which allow states to 
look outside of the four corners of a contract and impose terms that are not expressed within. 
The reservation of this necessary authority of the state is deemed to be part of 
the contract . . . speaking though Mr. Justice Brewer, nearly fifty years later in 
Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn: “But into all contracts, whether 
made between states and individuals or between individuals only, there enter 
conditions which arise, not out of the literal terms of the contract itself.  They 
are superinduced by the pre-existing and higher authority of the laws of nature, 
of nations, or of the community to which the parties belong. They are always 
presumed, and must be presumed, to be known and recognized by all, are 
binding upon all, and need never, therefore, be carried into express stipulation, 
for this could add nothing to their force.  Every contract is made in 
subordination to them, and must yield to their control, as conditions inherent 
and paramount, wherever a necessity for their execution shall occur.” 
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 435 (1934) (quoting Long Island Water 
Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 692 (1897)).  
473. Id. at 447. 
474. Id. at 439 (upholding a Minnesota statute that temporarily suspended mortgage 
foreclosures under certain circumstances and extended the period of time for redemption of property 
from mortgage foreclosure sale). 
475. Id. at 422 (citing Blaisdell v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 249 N.W. 334, 337 (Minn. 
1933)). 
476. Id. at 444. 
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economic crisis of great magnitude that has necessitated a host of federal 
government policies477 intended to provide relief and reverse the downward 
financial spiral.478  The case can be made that, in implementing these remedial 
policies, the federal government has in essence declared an economic emergency 
requiring the adoption of extraordinary measures.  Lenders, as a group, have 
perpetrated a devastatingly harmful act against borrowers.479  The court in 
Blaisdell recognized the need to intervene in existing mortgage loan contracts in 
order to address the unfairness of allowing lenders to proceed with foreclosures 
in an economic climate marked by widespread unemployment, depressed 
property prices, and a limited market for buyers.480 Similar to the time of 
Blaisdell, the prevailing economic conditions of the Great Recession mandate a 
retroactive application of the anti-deficiency law proposed. Taking such 
retroactive action will address the negative outcomes—for example, elongating 
the timetable for individuals to re-enter the housing market481 and restricting the 
ability of individuals to participate in the economy482—that are looming because 
of the less than optimal mortgage loan contracts that were produced.  The terms 
of these recourse loan contracts, as argued in Sections IV and V, arose in part 
because of the power differential existing between mortgagors and mortgagees.  
To the opponents of this proposal who may argue that Blaisdell can be 
distinguished in that the statute at issue in that case was temporary in nature483 
whereas this piece advocates the permanent removal of deficiency judgments as 
a remedy, it should be noted that both interventions have the potential to 
permanently affect the outcome of a foreclosure proceeding.  In Blaisdell the 
statute had the potential to impact whether a mortgagor was ultimately able to 
keep the property because the borrower was granted more time to exercise his 
right of redemption, instead of having the property lost to the mortgagee-
purchaser who in the pre-statute world would have had a shorter period of time 
before the property transfer was final.484  Similarly, the proposal advocated 
herein impacts potential outcomes in the foreclosure stage.  It ensures that the 
borrower does not have to contend with ongoing liability after relinquishing the 
                                                                                                                                   
477. These policies include quantitative easing, bank bailouts, low interest rates, etc. See 
RAMIREZ, supra note 290, at xiv. (discussing some of the policies).  
478. Id. at 444. 
479. These policies include quantitative easing, bank bailouts, low interest rates, etc. See 
Ramirez, supra note 290, at xiv. 
480. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 437. (acknowledging that “[t]he economic interests of the State 
may justify the exercise of its continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding 
interference with contracts”). States have an economic interest in ensuring that their residents are 
not so financially imperiled by their mortgage loan contracts that they cannot make economic 
contributions to their communities.  
481. See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 21. (indicating that a deficiency judgment can become a 
“foreclosure hangover”). 
482. Id. 
483. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 447 (“The legislation is temporary in question. It is limited to the 
exigency which called it forth”). 
484. Id. at 416. 
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foreclosed property, but it does not take away the lender’s possibility of 
immediately being made whole upon the sale of the property at the foreclosure 
sale or, in the event that the mortgagee is the purchaser of the property, selling 
the property at a later date to address any deficiency.  
This proposal advocates the statewide or federal adoption of a ban on 
deficiency judgments in residential mortgage loan transactions.485  The 
particularities of each state’s foreclosure statute prohibiting deficiency 
judgments will have an impact on the give-and-take character of the statutes. 
That is, in the absence of the proposed anti-deficiency law, some statutes may 
allow for a longer statutory redemption period but have a short window for the 
mortgagee to file for a deficiency judgment or have a short statute of limitations 
period to collect on the judgment.  Adopting the proposed legislation, will affect 
the balancing of interests reflected in the statute that is currently in place.  One 
likely outcome will be that lenders will lobby for a removal of the statutory 
redemption right or a severe limiting of the statutory period of redemption if they 
cannot pursue a deficiency judgment.  It is important to preserve the protections 
afforded to mortgage consumers and to expand them where needed.  Therefore, 
lawmakers must carefully assess any pressure exerted by lenders to curtail the 
existing safeguards for mortgagors in exchange for agreeing to prohibit 
deficiency judgments.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
The residential mortgage loan transaction is rife with potential for abuse. 
Substantial differences in the bargaining positions of lenders and borrowers 
mean that the weaker party—that is, the borrower—is vulnerable to exploitation, 
and cannot freely negotiate contract terms.  The Great Recession has highlighted 
the interdependency of the real estate market and the health of the national and 
global economies.486  Government intervention is needed where it is clear that 
the banking industry is operating with an apparent shortsightedness that fails to 
take into account the consequences of pursuing policies which have a 
devastating impact on mortgage loan consumers and the stability of economic 
systems.  This Article advocates for the elimination of deficiency judgments as a 
corrective measure to recourse residential mortgage loan contracts.  The 
government’s adoption of the proposal outlined should result in more efficient 
residential loan transactions because the proposed solution incentivizes lenders 
to be more rigorous in applying underwriting standards and in evaluating home 
appraisal values.  The banking industry’s vigilance in this respect will lead to 
less risky loans being made, less defaults, and less personal bankruptcies.  
                                                                                                                                   
485. This Article does not specifically address whether a federal law would be a better 
approach. The legislative change on a state-by-state basis may be more difficult to accomplish. 
486. Bernanke supra note 38 (“[H]ousing and mortgage markets are tightly interlinked with 
the rest of the economy.”) 
